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ABSTRACT

The challenges to stability, unity, and democracy in Iraq are
typically characterized as factional (sectarian and ethnic) or as struggle
against the presence of foreign troops. However, this assumption remains
largely erroneous. The problems and challenges in Iraq are actually and
overwhelmingly the result of power struggles, and the competition for
resources by political elites, and dominant political factions.
The political and electoral system emplaced in Iraq incentivizes
elites and political entities to undertake factional identities; in doing so,
it promotes identity politics. The current system also fails to filter the
contests for power through the electoral system. As such, fragmentation
within the government is maximized, and the political system in Iraq
becomes one that promotes extremism and incorporates extremist views,
thus, creating paralysis and hindering progress.
Consequently, this study proposes redesigning the Iraqi electoral
system in a way that compels elites to secure cross-factional support.
Such an approach will force political elites and candidates to undertake
median and moderate approaches to win and will promote moderate
ii

elites who must gain the support of the people.

This will allow

reconciliation efforts to progress steadily and will put Iraq on the right
path for consolidating its nascent democracy. Vitally important, such a
system will provide for democratic consolidation and sustainability
without the need of external interference. The challenge, however, is in
deciding how to introduce such an institutional redesign due to
entrenched interests of parties and elites that are served under the
current system.
The current political system in Iraq is parliamentarian; it follows the
concept of infusion of powers and is based on ―consensus‖ and informal
consociation. The electoral system in

Iraq

is a

closed-party-list

proportional representation. This study proposes an alternative political
and electoral system.

As a substitute political system, this study

proposes a hybrid system that largely follows the concept of separation of
powers. Under this system the chief executive—as opposed to the head
of state—will be directly elected by the people through a customized
majoritarian system that conditions victory in elections not only on
achieving 50+% of the vote, but also on achieving certain thresholds in
16 out of the 18 Iraqi provinces. Thus, only candidates who are
acceptable to all the ―components‖ of Iraqi society will assume the
responsibility of governing Iraq.

iii

The

Presidency

Council—the

head

of

state—can

follow

the

consociational principle, and remain as it is now. At present, the
presidency council in Iraq—which will give over power to a President in
the next elections—consists of a President and two Vice Presidents. The
presidency council‘s members are representatives of the three major
components of the Iraqi society—Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.
remain unchanged, voted in by parliament.

This can

In fact, preserving this

would check the strong Prime Minister proposed under this system. As
such, transparency, accountability, decisiveness, and cohesion, will be
combined with oversight.
As for elections to the legislature, this study proposes to convert the
electoral rules to single-member districts. Districts must be delineated
in such a way that candidates will largely compete against people of their
own (sectarian or ethnic) identity. Hence, candidates will be unable to
invoke their identities as credentials to win elections. Where possible,
minorities in districts will be included so that serious candidates
competing against others from their-own identity will be forced to appeal
also to people other than their identities. This will further compel
candidates to undertake moderate stands.
Essentially, the proposed system enhances the accountability of
elected officials to the electorate; it promotes substantive politics rather
than descriptive politics in Iraq; and it allows for the steady consolidation

iv

of democracy.

The proposed system also maintains unity within the

executive branch, and opens the way for reconciliation, reconstruction,
the provision of services and security, and political stability.
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The strategic objective of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) was to
establish constitutional democracy in a unified and stable Iraq, and to
facilitate the Iraqi society‘s embrace of free market capitalism as well as
social moderation, tolerance, and pluralism, to include respect for
human, minority and women‘s rights.

The international policy vision

informing the plan was to institute changes that would start a domino
effect of democratization cascading throughout the Middle East.1
Operation Iraqi Freedom after a spectacular success in the initial
military phase, turned into a chronic security problem, 2 and after more
than six years, has yet to achieve its objectives. 3

There remain many

security challenges in Iraq, for example: sectarian and ethnic tensions
are rampant, and serious human rights violations remain very common:4

Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra Ii: The inside Story of the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, First ed. (New York: Random House Inc., Pantheon
Books, 2006). 73 & 433. And: Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq (New York: Simon &
Schuster Paperbacks, 2006). 5, 9 & 10.
1

Colonel Jabbar Naeemah Karam, ―Post-Transition Violence in Iraq (2004-2005): The
Military Perspective of an Insider‖ (U.S. Army War College, 2006). 5.
2

James A. Baker III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report (United States Institute for
Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for the
Study of the Presidency (CSP), and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at
Rice University, 2006). 9 ―Saddam Hussein has been removed from power and the Iraqi
people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of Iraq‘s
population, yet the government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation,
providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level of violence is high
and growing. There is great suffering ….‖
3

"Iraq: Torture Continues at Hands of New Government : Police Systematically Abusing
Detainees", Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2005/01/24/iraqtorture-continues-hands-new-government (accessed 03/29/ 2009).
And:
Peter
Beaumont, "Abuse Worse Than under Saddam, Says Iraqi Leader," The Guardian,
11/27/ 2005. And: Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008, (UN Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 2008). 2 ―grave human rights violations that are less widely
reported, and the elimination of which requires long-term political commitment remain
4

1

The country appears heading towards a theocracy rather than a
democracy,5 and, acts of violence committed by non-state actors in all of
its forms—terrorism,6 insurgency,7 and, militias—are still very much of a
threat to Iraq‘s stability.8
Everyone knowledgeable of the situation recognizes that politics is
at the heart of such challenges and forms of violence. 9 As presented by
the Iraq Study groups:

unaddressed.‖ And: "Un: Human Rights Abuses in Iraq Still Widespread ", Voice of
America
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-12/2008-12-02voa66.cfm?CFID=152390694&CFTOKEN=29163464&jsessionid=883095ddcec5e6eb864
0343c664b3c2f78b5 (accessed 03/26/ 2009). And: III and others. 13 ―Iraqi police
cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the
unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The
police are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by
corruption and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the provinces.‖ And:
"Iraqi V.P. Calls for Forming Nat''L Gov''T to Salvage Country", Kuwait News Agency
(KUNA)
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1958809&La
nguage=en (accessed 01/28/ 2009). Reported that Iraqi Vice President Tarik Al-Hashimi
―noted that human rights conditions in Iraq were ‗regrettable.‘‖ And: Hope and Fear:
Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, (Amnesty International 2009).
Peter Grier, "Democracy's Push, Theocracy's Pull - in War's Wake: Is the Middle East
Bound for Resurgence of Radical Islam?," The Christian Science Monitor, 04/24/ 2003.
and, "Iraq's Permanent Constitution: Analysis and Recommendations ", United States
Commission
on
International
Religious
Freedom
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1888&Itemid=1
(accessed). And, Darrell Williams, "Iraq Is Now a Shiite Islamic Theocracy, Thanks to
Bush",
American
Chronicle
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/40367
(accessed 10/29 2008).
5

Human Security Brief 2006, (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia - LIU
Institute For Global Issues, 2006). 3.
6

Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus Commander,
Multi-National Force-Iraq, (Washington DC, 2007). 2.
7

8

Ibid. 2.

Counterinsurgency Operations Field Manual–Interim No. 3-07.22, (Washington, DC:
Headquarters Department of the Army, 2004). 1-1
and: "Testimony of Dr. Ahmed
S. Hashim," in U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Senate (Washington D.C.:
9

2

If the Iraqi government moves forward with
national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity
for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow,
stability will be enhanced in an important part of the
world, and America‘s credibility, interests, and values
will be protected. 10

In January 2007, former President George W. Bush announced a
military surge to provide a ―breathing space‖ for the Iraqi political
progress.11 Eventually, the security situation improved in Iraq. 12 Experts
inside and outside of government agree that the progress in Iraq is
remarkable13 (see figures 1, 2, 3).

2004). 2&3 and: Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 20062008 (New York: Simon & Schuster 2008). 234 the Defense Department team‘s
10

III and others. 6.

"Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq," New
York Times, 01/11/ 2007. 1. Also see: "Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq",
National Defense University - Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN)
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/WH/20070110-3.pdf (accessed 02/28/ 2009).
This is an abstraction the surge was one factor. However, the remaining actors are
irrelevant to this paper. and see: Woodward. 213.
11

Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus Commander,
Multi-National Force-Iraq. 1. And: Guy Raz, "Gates: Political Developments in Iraq
Discouraging," NPR, 08/03/ 2007. See also: "War in Iraq, Plan for Ending the War in
Iraq - the Problem", BarackObama.com http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/
(accessed 11/18/ 2008). And: "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly
Ending the War in Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", The White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-ObamaResponsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/ (accessed 02/28/ 2009).
―Thanks in great
measure to your service, the situation in Iraq has improved. Violence has been reduced
substantially from the horrific sectarian killing of 2006 and 2007. Al Qaeda in Iraq has
been dealt a serious blow by our troops and Iraq‘s Security Forces, and through our
partnership with Sunni Arabs. The capacity of Iraq‘s Security Forces has improved, and
Iraq‘s leaders have taken steps toward political accommodation. The relative peace and
strong participation in January‘s provincial elections sent a powerful message to the
world about how far Iraqis have come in pursuing their aspirations through a peaceful
political process. But let there be no doubt: Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be
difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq.‖ And: James
Kirkup, "Iraq: Basra Is Less Dangerous Than Manchester, British General Says," Daily
Telegraph, 02/07/ 2009.
12

3

This progress, whether on the security or the political levels, is the
result of tireless efforts and external pressures mainly exerted by the
United States over Iraqi political elites, 14 with numerous benchmarks
and milestones imposed.15 The necessity of these actions indicates that
the progress is not sustainable:16 military commanders and top American
officials in Iraq fear an eventual collapse in Iraq,17 and analysts agree

Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Evolution of Iraq
Strategy," in Restoring the Balance a Middle East Strategy for the Next President
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution and The Council on Foreign Relations 2008). 27
and: Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, The Second Cold War and Corporate Security
(Strasfor, 2008). iii.
13

Woodward. 188 ―most state institutions were minimally functional without U.S.
direction and support,‖ 191, 200, 211, & 216.
14

Ibid. 256 and: "U.S. Aircraft Opens Fire on Sons of Iraq Members," The Washington
Post, 04/03/ 2009. ―Under heavy pressure from the U.S. military, the Shiite-led Iraqi
government agreed to assume responsibility for the payments to the predominantly
Sunni armed groups and absorb some of them into its security forces.
But in recent
weeks, several Sons of Iraq groups have disintegrated and some members have rejoined
the insurgency, saying the government has failed to pay them on time and has been
slow to admit them into police academies.‖
15

Woodward. 192 & 237 David Gordon the representative from the Intelligence
community‘s opinion and: Thomas E. Ricks, "The War in Iraq Isn't Over. The Main
Events May Not Even Have Happened Yet.," The Washington Post, 02/15/ 2009. And:
Mustafa Mahmoud, "Feud Delays Iraq Committee Kirkuk Recommendations," Reuters,
03/29/ 2009. And: Charles Levinson, "Toll Rises as Iraq Slows Surge," Wall Street
Journal, 05/08/ 2009. ―Violence is on the rise in Iraq as American troops withdraw. A
ground-level look at the handover provides one explanation: The Iraqi government is
neglecting many of the successful counterinsurgency initiatives it is inheriting from the
U.S. military.‖
16

"Pentagon Brass Chafes at Obama's Iraq Pullout Plan," The Daily Star, 02/03/ 2009.
And: "Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee - as Submitted by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room Sd-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, January 27, 2009 ", U.S. Department of Defense
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337 (accessed 01/29/
2009).
And: Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, "Obama Meets with Officials on Iraq,
Signaling His Commitment to Ending War " The New York Times, 01/21/ 2009. And:
Peter Baker and Alissa J. Rubin, "Obama Pledge on Iraq Encounters Opposition,"
International Herald Tribune, 01/29/ 2009.
And: Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom
Shanker, "Military Planners, in Nod to Obama, Are Preparing for a Faster Iraq
Withdrawal," The New York Times, 01/14/ 2009. And: Martin Sieff, "Obama Imposes
His New Plans on Iraq, Afghan Wars," United Press International, Inc., 01/27/ 2009.
17

4

that the progress in Iraq remains ―fragile and reversible.‖ 18 Essentially,
now as previously, the political progress remains the major hurdle in
achieving the strategic objective of OIF. 19

The Baker/Hamilton Iraq

Study group summarized:
There is widespread Iraqi, American, and
international agreement on the key issues confronting
the Iraqi government: national reconciliation, including
the negotiation of a ―political deal‖ among Iraq‘s
sectarian groups on Constitution review, deBaathification, oil revenue sharing … the future of
Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing
militias … and governance, including the provision of

Military commanders, expert bureaucrats, and civil servants. They have argued against
the preferences of the President and provided other alternatives. General Raymond
Odierno the Commanding General of the Multi National Forces in Iraq and highest
ranking General there, General David Petraeous the CENTCOM commander. And,
Secretary Gates aligns himself with the military commanders, fearing a collapse in Iraq.
In general, top and middle ranking military officers in Iraq see a quick withdrawal from
Iraq as destabilizing, and would reverse gains achieved in that country. And: Anthony
Shadid, "Departing U.S. Envoy in Iraq Sees Risks Ahead - Crocker Warns against
Abrupt Troop Withdrawal," The Washington Post, 01/23/ 2009. Ryan Crocker who
recently left his post in Iraq as the American Ambassador, strongly warned of some
―very serious risks‖ that a hasty troops withdrawal from Iraq entails. These risks were
summarized as: security breakdown, a reversal of the political progress that has been
made, and, chaos. Crocker warned that such a withdrawal would send the wrong
message to the Iraqi people and political factions, which would force them to go back
and entrench themselves in order to be prepared of what is next.
Shadid. And: Burton and Stewart. Iv and: Michael J. Sodaro, Comparative Politics:
A Global Introduction 3rd Edition ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Companies, 2008). 267.
And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 29
18

"Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed). And: "U.S. To Be 'More Aggressive' with Iraq on
Political Reform," AFP, 02/27/ 2009. And: Raz. And: "War in Iraq, Plan for Ending
the War in Iraq - the Problem", (accessed). ―despite the improved security situation,
the Iraqi government has not stepped forward to lead the Iraqi people and to reach the
genuine political accommodation that was the stated purpose of the surge … the
absence of genuine political accommodation in Iraq.‖ And: Matthew Duss and Peter
Juul, The Fractured Shia of Iraq: Understanding the Tensions within Iraq’s Majority
(Washington DC: Center for American Progress, January 2009). 2 ―The U.S. troop surge
in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 was intended to provide the political space for reconciliation
among the Kurds and Sunni and Shia Arabs, which remains elusive.‖
19

5

basic services
corruption.20

and

the

rollback

of

pervasive

Since taking power in January 2009, the Obama administration
has been shifting from the military and security aspects 21 to focus
primarily on the political progress in Iraq. President Obama recognized
that ―the long-term solution in Iraq must be political – not military‖22
and

summarized

the

challenges

in

the

statement:

―too

many

fundamental political questions about Iraq‘s future remain unresolved
....‖23 Vice President Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr has also emphasized a
political approach to end the war on Iraq24 in his remarks ―the United
States would prod Iraq's government on forging political reform.‖ 25 He
said that the US has to be ―much more aggressive ... forcing Iraqis to
deal with those issues.‖26 Ambassador Christopher Hill stated that his
priority in Iraq would be ―buttressing its still-shaky government.‖27

20

III and others. 16. Also see: Woodward. 223.

"Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed). ―President Barack Obama announced his plan to
end the war in Iraq. By August 31, 2010 the US ―combat mission in Iraq will end.‖
And, by the end of 2011 and according the status of forces agreement, all the troops—
even the residual force will be pulled out of Iraq.‖
21

22

Ibid., (accessed).

23

Ibid., (accessed).

24

"U.S. To Be 'More Aggressive' with Iraq on Political Reform."

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27

"Obama's Envoy Pick: Iran Is Real Problem for Iraq," AFP, 03/25/ 2009.

6

Political reform to promote a sustainable and self-reinforcing
progress in Iraq is the foundation of the Obama administration‘s new
strategy for victory in Iraq. The strategy, as announced by the Obama
administration states:
This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable
goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an
Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant … To achieve
that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that
is just, representative, and accountable, … a strong political,
diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance
progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and
security … We can serve as an honest broker in pursuit of fair
and durable agreements on issues that have divided Iraq’s
leaders. And just as we will support Iraq‘s Security Forces,
we will help Iraqi institutions strengthen their capacity to
protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic
services ….28

Basically, this study argues that achieving the original goal of OIF
and the outcome intended by the military surge, and fulfilling the goals
of the Obama administration‘s strategy in Iraq will require ―reforming the
decision making process‖29 in Iraq through reforming the ―formal
electoral rules‖30 and mechanisms.31 This course of action is imperative

"Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed).
28

Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Revised Edition
ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002). 355.
29

Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge
University Press, 2004). 7 ―formal electoral rules are understood here as the legislative
framework governing elections, as embodies in official documents, constitutional
conventions, legal statues, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized
by law and enforceable by courts.‖ Also see: Stone. 287 ―rules create rather surprising
incentives to assume particular identities.‖ And: Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History,
Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 2004). 1 & 104.
30

Stone. 354 & 367 ―Mechanic the metaphor suggests taking our policy problems to a
mechanic rather than fighting them out in a political contest. By focusing on ends
31

7

since ―electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the most
basic democratic structures, from which much else follows.‖32
Therefore, in Chapter One, this study will demonstrate that the
essence of the problem in Iraq lies in the nature and actions of the Iraqi
elites.33 Chapter Two, analyzes the current political structure and
electoral system in Iraq, demonstrating how the political and electoral
system in Iraq institutionalizes the actions of these elites and facilitates
the enhancement of factional identities.
The reform advocated in this study is inspired by the American
experience during the revision of the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitutional Convention.

Consequently, Chapter Three explores the

American experience during this specific, constitution-building era and
draws parallels between the current situation in Iraq and the challenges
the US faced after its Declaration of Independence, incorporating lessons
from the American experience and demonstrating how those lessons
inform the strategy advocated here.

(better for what?) rather than distribution (better for whom) this approach conceals
questions of power. Problems of authority are converted into a matter of technical
requirement.‖
32

Norris. 3.

III and others. 15 ―The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and
key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq‘s Shia,
Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in
Iraq‘s national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern
effectively. The result is an even weaker central government than the constitution
provides.‖ & 20 ―too many political leaders still pursue their personal, sectarian, or
party interests.‖
33

8

Chapter Four, building on previous discussion, advocates a
substitute electoral system for Iraq that will provide remedies to the
problems stated in Chapter Two.

It is strongly informed by the

statement:
Electoral reform is founded upon the principle that
altering the formal rules matters based on the assumption
that certain desirable consequences for certain social and
political engineering can be achieved.34

Hence, the proposed reformation aims at reshaping the ―form and
membership of the decision-making body,‖35 by changing ―who makes
the decision‖ to reshape the outcome in Iraq. 36

This study concludes

that even though the advocated system entails difficulties; nevertheless,
it will provide the most efficacious overall approach—given the context of
Iraqi specificities—to the range of problems facing Iraq.
It is important to remember that without solid and steady political
progress in Iraq, America will win every battle and gain victories on the
tactical and operational levels, but will never win the war and achieve its
strategic objective. Therefore, this study proposes a system that will forge
consensus among the Iraqi people rather than the political elites.
Furthermore, the institutional reforms advocated in this study will, as is
demonstrated, produce a lasting mechanism that will channel the Iraqi
efforts to compete through democratic institutions, under the conviction
34

Norris. 5.

35

Stone. 356.

36

Ibid. 355.

9

that the attempts to establish democracy will only be ―consolidated when
most conflicts are processed through democratic institutions.‖37

Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 51.
37

10

Chapter I:
The Essence of the Problem in Iraq And Means To Mitigate It

Shifting the focus from military and security to political issues, is
indeed the right path. Violence in Iraq is typically characterized as being
either against an occupying force, or factional (sectarian and ethnic).
While the elements of such motivations are present, and indeed are
responsible for some problems, nevertheless, this assumption remains
largely erroneous.38 Sectarian and ethnic strife is not the primary cause
of violence,39 nor is the presence of foreign troops. The main driver of
violence in Iraq is the struggle for power40 and competition for resources
by political elites.41

"Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," International
Organization 54, no. 4 (2000). 855 ―observers may be concluding too quickly that
popular involvement in "ethnic violence" and support for extremist leaders is motivated
in a straightforward fashion by underlying ethnic animosities and fears‖
and:
Woodward. 244 General George Casey‘s statement ―the current conflict in Iraq is as
much about division of political and economic power as it is sectarian violence.‖
38

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London:
The John Hopkins University Press, 1996). 20, 21, 22, 30, & 35.
39

Paul Risley and Timothy D. Sisk, Policy Options on Democratic Reform, Democracy and
United Nations Peace-Building at the Local Level: Lessons Learned (Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005). 8 ―‗At the
centre of virtually every conflict is the State and its power—who controls it and how it is
used. No conflict can be resolved without answering those questions, and nowadays the
answers almost always have to be democratic ones, at least in form…. Democracy is
practiced in many ways, and none of them is perfect. But at its best it provides a means
for managing and resolving disputes peacefully, in an atmosphere of mutual trust‘‖
and: Timothy D. Sisk, Pathway of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War,
Discussion Draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building. (Denver: University
of Denver, 2006). And: Sisk; Sameer N. Yacoub, "Iraqi Prime Minister Lectures against
Sectarianism," AP, 01/25/ 2009. Prime Minister Maliki‘s statement "The constitution
has not called for the division of the country, but the people who have the ambition to
create their own mini-state here and there were behind such practices,"
and:
40

11

Elections and their aftermath promise to be
contentious and potentially bloody as Iraq‘s three main
ethnic and religious groups—the … Kurds and Sunni
Arabs and the … Shia Arabs—vie for power. More
troubling still, factions within each of these ethnic and
sectarian groups will contend for power in the regions
they dominate—using local patronage and control of
Iraq‘s resources, revenues, and guns, as well as appeals
based on longstanding religious traditions in Iraq ….42

In his book, Paul Bremer‘s description of several encounters with
the Iraqi Governing Council (GC) members—who were trying to secure ―a
piece of the pie,‖43 the pie being Iraq44—nicely proves this point.45

Mohammad
Akef
Jamal,
"Victim
of
Quota
System",
Gulf
News
http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10275537.html (accessed 02/25/
2009). And: Woodward. 186, 187, 189, 242 The opinion of General George Casey the
MNFI commander in Iraq: ―there is a struggle for division of power between Iraqis.‖
And: Duss and Juul. 1 ―On January 31, 2009, Iraqis will vote in the country‘s first
provincial elections in four years. These elections will deliver a preliminary verdict on
the vigorous and often violent competition between Iraq‘s contending political factions,
and help shape the contours of Iraq‘s future.‖ And: Sodaro. 264. And: Ghaith AbdulAhad, "Six Years after Saddam Hussein, Nouri Al-Maliki Tightens His Grip on Iraq," The
Guardian, 04/30/ 2009. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service
(INSI) stated that: ―It‘s not about sects any more its about the party, the interest of the
party.‖
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus Commander,
Multi-National Force-Iraq. ―The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition
among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources.‖ And: Cynthia J.
Arnson and L. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War, the Intersection of
Need, Cree, and, Greed (Washington The Woodrow Wilson International Center For
Scholars, 2005). 3 ―David Keen ‗war is not simply a breakdown in a particular system,
but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.‘‖ And:
III and others. 19 ―The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support
of national reconciliation.‖
41

Duss and Juul. 1 & 2. Also see: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 39. And: Sam
Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors‘ Barriers," The New York Times,
05/05/ 2009. And: Steven Lee Myers, "Iraqi Forces: Rebuilt and Stronger, but Still
Stumbling," The New York Times, 05/07/ 2009.
42

L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2006). 148 & 149.
43

44

Ibid. 296, & 303.

Ibid. Presented with an understanding of the risk of over-generalizing, and
acknowledging that there were competent figures in the GC, or members of the GC
45
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Violence in Iraq is elite led.46

Sectarian and ethnic banners are

mainly means for these elites to mobilize support and maintain their
struggle for power against

their adversaries. 47

These elites also

indoctrinate people and manipulate their insecurities, for their—the
political elites‘—own gains and purposes.48

political parties that rose to the level of responsibility after the handover of sovereignty.
These competent figures are exceptions to the description of the elites that this paper
portrays. The intention here is to address the group characteristic, and the outcome of
including this group. Keeping in mind whilst reading this study, that all the senior
positions—President, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers, dominant political figures inside
and outside parliament—up until today are either occupied by members of the
Governing Council convened by Paul Bremer, or are senior members of the parties that
formed the GC; the following encounters reflects the point this thesis is making that the
elites are responsible for the mischief in Iraq:
123
―The Governing Council‘s
effectiveness was hampered, from the first day to the last, by lax work habits. They
established a pattern of meeting Monday through Thursday, usually just in the
morning, but even then not starting until after 10:00 A.M. After treating themselves to
a lavish luncheon, members would drift off to other activities or a long siesta in the
baking after noon … the Governing Council worked fewer hours in a week than the CPA
worked every day.‖ & 124 ―the one issue on which the GC did work quickly was paying
itself … they came up with an outrageous budget for the Council … they were to have
gasoline allowance which … will allow each member to drive fifty thousand miles a
month … the budget that they proposed for the twenty-five member GC was more than
that of the Education Ministry, which had more than 325,000 employees.‖ & 189 ―It
was clear that we were reaching a crisis point on the Governing Council‘s
ineffectiveness … the twenty four members, still split along sectarian and ethnic lines.‖
& 195 Bremer called them the ―‗committee of the Black Hole,‘ since nothing ever
emerged from the Council.‖
46

Jim Hoagland, "Iraq's Good Example," The Washington Post, 02/08/ 2009.

"Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 853. And:
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors
in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984). 744 ―symbolic
behavior is also a strategic element in political competition. Individuals and groups are
frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths without believing them and while violating
their implications.
In particular, a serious theoretical understanding of myths,
symbols, and rituals must include some attention to the dynamics of symbols, to the
processes by which symbols shape the behavior not only of the innocent but of the
society as a whole.‖ And: Yacoub.
47

Stone. 323 ―indoctrination is defined as the intentional manipulation of opinions and
preferences and the destruction or prevention of independent judgment … it happens in
the everyday relation between citizens and between citizens and the states‖ & 315
―relationship in which dominant elites control peoples beliefs and knowledge in a
manipulative and self-interested way. Then it is possible to see how indoctrination can
48
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The ―ongoing‖49 intra-sect confrontations between rival but likeminded

religious

Shiite

factions

for

supremacy, 50

and

similar

confrontations between rival Sunni parties for power,51 are clear
indicators that the struggle in Iraq is for power. Even the interaction

happen in non-totalitarian societies.‖ And: Woodward. 245 Iraqi Leaders are advancing
Sectarian Agendas.‖ & 246 Former Secretary Condoleezza Rice‘s questioning ―if they
themselves are undermining population security through sectarianism how in the world
are we going to use American forces to do it?‖ & ―the intelligence indicated that the
Maliki government still showed signs of backing a sectarian agenda.‖
Duss and Juul. 1 ―the ongoing competition among rival Shia factions—manifested in
a series of political and military confrontations in the wake of the U.S. overthrow of
Saddam Hussein.‖ 2 ―How the points of contention among Iraq‘s Shia parties, which
mirror the divisions within Iraq‘s broader Shia Arab community, are resolved at the
ballot box and in the streets of the country by their respective militias.‖ & 2 ―… three
dominant and fiercely independent Shia political organizations—the Da‘wa Party, the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, and the Sadrists, along with the smaller but
still significant Fadhila—will attempt through the ballot box and armed conflict to
secure a majority of Shia votes in Iraq in order to lead the country‘s Shia-majority
provinces. And: Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service
(INSI) stated that: "Maliki and the leadership of Dawa [Maliki's party] managed to obtain
the loyalty of military and civilian institutions and commanders and now those officers
are loyal to Dawa and moved their alliances from other parties.
49

"Bloodshed in Iraq, Intra-Shia Violence Amid Other Underlines", The Economist
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10925638 (accessed
11/11/ 2008). And: Philip Zelikow, "The New Strategic Situation in Iraq", Foreign Policy
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/09/the_new_strategic_situation_in_ir
aq (accessed 02/25/ 2009). ―The United Iraqi Alliance bloc is disintegrating (the largest
bloc in parliament that is purely Shiite).‖ And: III and others, The Iraq Study Group
Report. 16 ―fissures have emerged within the broad Shiite coalition, known as the
United Iraqi Alliance. Shiite factions are struggling for power—over regions, ministries,
and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and fractious coalition
have led several observers in Baghdad to comment that Shiite leaders are held ―hostage
to extremes.‖ Within the coalition as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political
accommodation with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias.‖ And: III, My Year in Iraq:
The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 148 , 195, 196, 198, 330, 368, & 369. And:
Alissa J. Rubin, "Shiite Rivalries Slash at a Once Calm Iraqi City," The New York Times,
06/21/ 2007.
50

Karen DeYoung, "Experts Doubt Drop in Violence in Iraq, Military Statistics Called
into Question," The Washington Post, 09/06/ 2007. And: Zelikow, (accessed). ―Sunni
parties ... Are fractured.‖ And: Fadhel Al-Badrani, "Iraq Tribes Threaten to Take up
Arms over Poll," Reuters, 02/02/ 2009. And: Mohammed Abbas, "Iraq Sunni AntiQaeda Leader Eyes Shi'ite Alliance," Reuters, 04/12/ 2009. ―A senior leader in a Sunni
Arab movement founded to combat al Qaeda in Iraq is edging away from the military
activity of the past, toward a once unthinkable alliance with the country's Shi'ite prime
minister.‖
51
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between the Kurdish parties ―each vying to outdo the other‖52 proves the
point.53
Consequently, redesigning the electoral process will facilitate
shifting the locus of power54 and allow Iraqi politics to shift from the
power games of the elites—molded as identity-based politics and leading
to ―descriptive representation‖55—to ―substantive representation.‖56
Building on the premise that ―formal electoral rules are not neutral
in their impact; instead, they systematically benefit some while
penalizing others,‖57 ―the hope in proposing a structural change is to

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 386. Also see: Scott
Carpenter and Michael Rubin, "Kurdistan's Troubled Democracy," The Washington Post,
04/18/ 2009. And: "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'," BBC, 04/14/ 2009.
52

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 96 ―on July 10, 2003 the
two Kurdish parties informed us that they had been unable to agree between them on
any additional female member,‖ 124 ―the Two Kurdish leaders … had been unable to
agree which of them should take the Kurdish seat. So they demanded that each of
them be seated in the Councils Presidency,‖ 149 ―the Kurds divvied up their five cabinet
positions between the two main Kurdish parties.‖ Furthermore, The Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), fought bitterly over
the control of the Kurdish region after gaining de facto autonomy following Iraq‘s defeat
in the first Gulf War. And, they continued to run completely separate and disconnected
areas of influence in the northern Kurdish region, with two governments and territories,
until after 2003. This occurred despite the fact that both are Kurdish nationalist
parties, and Sunni Muslims. Also see: "Amnesty International Warns of Rights Abuses
in Iraqi Kurdistan," Washington TV, 04/14/ 2009.
53

March and Olsen. 744 ―internal institutional processes affect things like the power
distribution, the distribution of preferences, or the management of control.‖
54

Stone. 359 ―representatives who share important demographic characteristics with
their constituents.‖
55

Ibid. 359 ―representatives who share important policy beliefs and goals with their
constituents.‖
56

Norris. 9. Also see: Donald L. Horowitz, "Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision
Makers," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 4 (October 2003). 116 ―The fact that each
electoral system contains a different array of biases from every other electoral system
57
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split up old or potential alliances, establish new ones, and so place a
favored interest in a position of dominance.‖58 Finally, this study‘s
recommendations are devised in such a way to filter the Iraqi elites and
promote moderates.59
Moderates share the perspective of a free democratic Iraq;
therefore, shifting power in their favor will make attaining the strategic
objectives stated above, feasible, and enduring.60 Note that such a
proposal is closely aligned with the objective of the military surge to ―buy
time … so that a moderate coalition can emerge.‖ 61
The United States can play a crucial role in advancing such a
structural change. The US remains an important stake holder in Iraq. 62
Most of the key actors in Iraq are still vulnerable vis-à-vis each other.63

means that those who decide among such systems can choose, in effect, to prefer one
set of biases over another.‖
58

Stone. 375.

Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International
Security 22, no. 2 (1997). 58 ―designing electoral arrangements that reward moderation
rather than extremism‖ and: Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political
Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44 (1996). 939 ―what do
institutions do? … they provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and
action … provide filters for interpretation … institutions affect the very identities, selfimage, and preferences of actors.‖ & 941 ―institutions distribute power unevenly across
social groups or interests.‖
59

60

"Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government," AFP, 01/29/ 2009.

61

Woodward. 275.

Zelikow,
Iraq.‖
62

(accessed). ―The U.S. military presence remains a large, vital, reality in

Ibid. (accessed). ―there are growing dangers of civil conflict in northern Iraq … the
United States could find itself caught in the middle between Kurdish friends, local
63
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This alignment will allow the US to play a pivotal role—possibly even
serve as a ―trigger‖64—to induce this change, if it is to adopt such a
structural re-modification as an essential part of its ―political surge.‖ 65
The US can exert external pressures, provide inducements to alter the
political calculus, and promote the advocated change.66
The US intervention in this matter will help tilt the balance and
mitigate the extreme asymmetries of power among those who genuinely
share America‘s vision of the new Iraq, and extremists in power. 67 These
extremists benefit from the current formula; moderates, on the other
hand, are left much too weak.

Thus, they cannot possibly induce a

change.68 Therefore, external interference is crucial for such an
institutional change. If and when such a change materializes, Iraq will
then be on the right path, as this study will show.69

Sunni nationalists, and a central government in Baghdad that might be tempted to win
Sunni friends by "dealing" forcefully with the Kurds. The Kurds might be a tempting
scapegoat for a government that wants to highlight itself as an Arab national unifier …
And the decline in oil prices will constrain the national government's largess.‖
64

Pierson. 141.

Stone. 274 ―incentives work by capitalizing on the weaknesses of the targets, not by
empowering them.‖ & 305 persuasion possibly even through inducing fear
Also see: "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq
(Camp Lejeune, North Carolina)", (accessed).
65

66

Stone. 266 &267 and: Hall and Taylor. 939.

67

Hall and Taylor. 938.

Pierson. 143 also see: 142 ―‗institutional resilience.‘ Can be accounted as factors to
sustain the institutional change.‖ Also see: Stone. 269 ―no fear of attenuation.‖
68

69

Hoagland.
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Chapter II:
The Political and Electoral System in Post Saddam’s Iraq— Flawed And
Malfunctioning

The strategic objective of OIF suffered a fatal blow because of the
way the political process was operationalized in Iraq. Even before the
onset of OIF, the Americans relied on a group of Iraqis in exile 70 for
information on how to shape post-Saddam Iraq.71 The Iraqi political and
electoral systems were devised by the Coalition Provincial Authority, after
consultations with the UN.72
The Iraqi political system is parliamentarian. It follows the concept
of infusion of powers. The parliament consists of 275 representatives. 73
The electoral system established after 2003 is a closed party list 74

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 48, 55, 58, 59, 83, 92, 93,
Bad advice from Iraqi exiles of whom many showed no reservation to project their
biased approach, or even outright dismay with the Concept of Iraq as a country. As
such, 27, 38, 54, 59, 81, 93, 94 Paul Bremer came to Iraq with a sectarian mind set.
224 and continued to build on that mind set by taking advice from such sectarian and
ethnically biased figures as he states in deriving his conclusions ―all my conversation
with Kurdish and Shiite Leaders.‖ And: Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military
Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006). 391 ―Bremer took bad advice.‖
70

Gordon and Trainor. 582&583 (Subject: Iraq: Political consultations, 19 June, point
#4 and 8). And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 26.
71

Pierson. 104 the CPA and UN ―determined the choice of the formal institutions in
Iraq.‖ And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 218, see also:
230, 240, 328, 348, 356, & 367.
72

73

Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet, (United Nations Electoral Assistance Division). 5 & 6.

74

Ibid. 6.
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proportional representation,75 and Iraq as a whole is a single electoral
district.76 People merely vote for closed and broad coalition lists
consisting of 275 candidates to elect representatives to the legislative. 77
These representatives elect a president and, the President in turn

Ibid. 5, 7 & 8 ―Inclusive: The main purpose for the national assembly in the transition
is to form a constituent assembly. The legitimacy of the constitution will depend heavily
on broad inclusiveness and representation of interests amongst the national assembly.
The PR system is most effective in gaining inclusive representation for a range of
groups, rather than a ―winner take-all‖ system (plurality-majority systems), where large
groups can secure an overwhelming majority. Simple and transparent: The PR system
allows a voter to cast one vote, which simplifies the voting process to include lowering
the voter education requirements – and creates a more transparent system. The
simplicity of the system also makes it more operationally feasible to implement. No
census data required: The system can be implemented on a single national district
without census data and a lengthy and controversial exercise to determine sub-national
electoral districts. In so doing, it also minimizes difficulties and controversies of
population movement within the country (e.g. Kirkuk). Best for women and minorities:
The system accommodates the goal for achieving women‘s representation and fair
representation of minorities, as they will be able to vote collectively from around the
country for the same list or candidate. (If the elections were conducted in sub-national
districts, their votes would be restricted to localized parties or large national groups
with the resources to compete around the country.) Encourages alliances and moderate
positions: The system encourages political groups to form alliances around the country
and appeal to as many constituencies as possible. Similarly, this need to appeal to
differing constituencies tends to moderate a group‘s position. At the same time, the PR
system also allows independent candidates to be elected, without forcing them to join
political parties. Permits local representation: By not requiring national
coverage/presence and permitting partial lists (of as few as 12 candidates), as well as
independent candidates – the system permits a basis for localized representation to
emerge. Least vulnerable to security problems: The national district permits candidates
to campaign with less disruption caused by localized violence or insecurity. By being
placed on a national ballot, the effectiveness of targeted political violence against
candidates is minimized. Similarly, lists of candidates reduce the ability to individually
target and intimidate. Most accommodating to out-of-country voting: The system
accommodates a practical response to out-of-country voting. A national district permits
out-of-country voters to participate in the process, as their vote does not have to be
counted towards a sub-national location, which can be highly controversial. The IECI
has decided to pursue a limited (will occur in several countries) out-of-country
operation that is estimated to cost about US$90 million. (The countries in which out-ofcountry voting may occur have not been determined at this time.)‖
75

76

Ibid. 6.

Norris. 51 in closed lists ―voter can only select which party to support, and each party
decides the ranking of their candidates on the list. The rank order of candidates on the
party list determines who is elected to parliament.‖
77
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nominates a Prime Minister from the majority bloc in parliament.78 The
Prime Minister (PM) must be voted in by the parliament,79 and is the
chief executive in Iraq.80 The PM is also the Commander in Chief of the
armed forces.81
The rationale behind choosing such a system was that proportional
representations are easy to design and implement.82 The idea was that
the designed system is ―inclusive‖ and ―represents a broad and diverse
cross-section of the Iraqi society.‖ 83 However, these designers left out a
consequential question, the inclusion of whom?

The consequences of

overlooking such a question were and are devastating, as this study will
demonstrate.84
The previous regime in Iraq was dictatorial and governed through a
single party85 for three and a half decades. 86 This diminished the
78

Country Profile: Iraq, (Washington DC: Federal Research Division, 2006). 16.

79

Ibid. 17.

80

Ibid. 16 and: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 373.

81

Country Profile: Iraq. 16.

82

Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet. 6.

83

Ibid. 5.

Horowitz. 115 ―To evaluate an electoral system or to choose a new one, it is
necessary to ask first what one wants the electoral system to do. No electoral system
simply reflects voter preferences or the existing pattern of cleavages in a society or the
prevailing political party configuration. Every electoral system shapes and reshapes
these features of the environment, and each does so in different ways.‖ Also see for the
interactions among electoral rules and elites: Richard Gunther, "Electoral Laws, Party
Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," The American Political Science Review 83, no. 3
(1989). 835 & 853.
84
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prospects for the emergence of civil society. Hundreds of thousands if
not millions of Iraqi citizens were victims of massacres.

Iraqis lived

under the oppression and tyranny of a handful of loyalists faithful to
Saddam under a single party system. 87 This took a very heavy toll on the
Iraqi social fabric;88 emotions were high, and wounds were fresh.
Saddam Hussein, the head of this tyrannical regime governed with an
iron fist. This eliminated the chances for political parties to form and
evolve. There were no organized political parties, with the exception of a
few mainly extremist parties ―offering nondemocratic ideologies …
representing ethnic or religious positions … and, parties based on a
proposal to break up the existing nation-state.‖89 These parties were
formed and vetted in other countries in the region, and lived in exile. 90
Iraq as a nation was dismantled after the fall of Baghdad.

The

government collapsed, and there was no replacement; the Iraqi Security

Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge University Press,
2008). 152.
85

86

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 30 & 79.

87

Ibid. 35.

88

Ibid. 379.

Jr. G. Bingham Powell, "Party Systems and Political System Performance: Voting
Participation, Government Stability and Mass Violence in Contemporary Democracies,"
The American Political Science Review 75, no. 4 (1981). P862& P865
89

90

Gordon and Trainor. 470.
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Forces were dissolved, and the infrastructure and institutions were
looted and burned.91 This dismantlement left a vacuum.92
Consequently, after the fall of Saddam‘s regime and transition
from dictatorship, the institutional gap was filled by the previously
mentioned extremist parties that had been in exile.93 The majority of
these parties are formed around ethnic and sectarian lines; they held
ideologies that negated all that the American objective stood for and had
regional ties that ran against the US‘s vision for the future of Iraq and
the region.94
The designed political system in Iraq yielded unanticipated
consequences.95

The political and electoral systems employed in Iraq

alienated the constituency,96 empowered radical and extremist political
parties and elites, and excluded moderates.97

91

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 37.

92

Ibid. 27, & 31.

Sisk. 5 ―Civil society is weak and populations are traumatized by the effects of war:
weak civil society and affected populations are less able to stand up to political forces
led by extremists or ideologues‖ and: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future
of Hope. 49.
93

94

Gordon and Trainor. 470.

95

Pierson. 104.

Stone. 298 ―in proportional representation a legislator‘s electoral fortune depends far
more on that of his own political party and less on pleasing voters with tangible and
symbolic rewards.‖
96

Ayad Allawi, "How Iraq‘s Elections Set Back Democracy," The New York Times,
11/02/ 2007. ―gave rise to our sectarian Parliament, controlled by party leaders rather
97
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Basically, the implemented system has totally backfired.

To

illustrate the connection between the structure of the devised political
system in Iraq and the unraveling of events, the following paragraph
reveals similar results of employing the same kind of system in another
country.

For in fact, the emplaced system in Iraq is a replica of the

electoral system in Israel, and has yielded an exacerbated form of the
complications from which Israel is suffering:98
The choice and composition of the government were
practically out of the hands of the voters.
Popular disaffection with the established parties rose,
and the overall perception of democracy was being
tarnished.
Electoral deadlock was no longer an exception, but the
norm.
New and splinter parties were encouraged to form,
thereby constantly increasing the fragmentation and
polarization of the party system …
Multiparty governments made the process of decision
making difficult, with veto power granted to most
parties in the coalition on a variety of issues.
Cabinet crises occurred frequently, immobilizing the
government for long periods of time.
The overall result was not only a non-working
parliamentary format, but a dangerous crisis of
democratic authority. 99

than by the genuine representatives of the people. They have assembled a government
unaccountable and unanswerable to its people.‖
Reuven Y. Hazan, "Presidential Parliamentarism Direct Popular Election of the Prime
Minister, Israel‘s New Electoral and Political System," Electoral Studies 15, no. 1 (1996).
23 ―The Israeli polity entered a crisis period … during which the two major parties tried
to outbid each other with ever-increasing offers in order to 'purchase' the political
support of the religious parties.‖
98

99

Ibid. 27.
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Similar repercussions in Iraq from instituting the same, of the
political system of Israel, are due to the failure to measure how the
designed political and electoral system relates to the following attributes
of the Iraqi context:100
First, proportional systems require unity,101 a requirement that the
political parties in Iraq can not satisfy. If this requirement is absent, then
proportional systems: (a) will produce coalition governments that are
fragmented, weak, and, unstable;102 and (b) will enable extremist parties
to gain power, and produce legislative fractionalization.103 As such,
proportional representation has ―reinforced, rather than ameliorated …
cleavages.‖104
At best, proportional systems in post-war state-building hinder
democratic development and progress,105 and, may ―stimulate a loss of

100

Allawi.

Andre Blais, "The Debate over Electoral Systems," International Political Science
Review 12, no. 3 (1991). 243. Also: to further clarify what this study means by unity:
proportional representation without the presence of an honored pact among the elites,
or lack of ―adjustment,‖ or the lack of common vision on basic yet characteristically
defining issues, would lead to disunity. For definition of pact see: Guillermo O'Donnell
and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University
Press: The Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 1986). 37.
101

102

Ibid. 242.

103

G. Bingham Powell. 874.

104

Norris. 65.

105

Sisk. 20.
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confidence in representative democracy.‖ 106 In the worst case scenario,
this system is a threat to the democratic regime, 107 will diminish the
prospects of democracy to survive,108 and will lead to a ―breakdown of
democracy.‖109
―The median country has about 9 percent of the vote going to
extremist parties in the average election … 15 percent as a mark of
extremist support of a serious nature, a figure that seems roughly to
correspond to the point at which observers of the country begin to
express concern.‖110 In Iraq the level of elected parties that fall within
the scope of extremism as defined above are close to 90%.111 If 15%
extremists should generate serious concern, then, the 90% must set off
alarms that necessitate revising the entire system.
Fragmentations within the government are maximized because of
the political system in Iraq that promotes extremism and incorporates
extremist parties in the government.112 Therefore, instead of settling the

106

Blais. 242.

107

Ibid. 255.

108

G. Bingham Powell. 861.

109

Blais. 242.

110

G. Bingham Powell. 865.

111

Galbraith. 3 & 89.

Yacoub. ―Iraq's Prime Minister said sectarianism is a ‗rotten thing‘ and … blamed
sectarianism for destroying the country.‖
112
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accounts and differences through the electoral process; 113 the diversity of
interests and approaches are all brought into the government.114
The end result in Iraq today is a natural outcome of this system. 115
―The lethality of conflict in Iraq has reached horrendous proportions for
civilians. … The US promotion of democracy in this country provides
space for partisan electoral politics by ethnic and religious groups … and
also, paradoxically, increases risks of terrorism.‖ 116
Second, the implemented system totally alienated the Iraqi
people,117 since the closed party list version of the proportional system
gives the elites the ability to determine who gets elected in Iraq. 118 The
voter merely votes for coalition lists, and does not have a say in choosing
candidates.119

113

Blais. 244.

114

Ibid. 242 & 244.

So, the elites have the upper hand in forming the

Hall and Taylor. 937 & 938 the structure of institutions molds politics. And:
Pierson. 165 ―North‘s definition of institutions ‗the rules of the game in a society or …
the humanly devised constrains that shape human interaction.‖
115

J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict
(Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of
Maryland, 2008). 9.
116

Blais. 242 ―voters exercise less control over the government. It is more difficult to get
rid of a coalition than of a one-party government.‖
117

Sisk. 9 ―closed-list nature of the system gives political parties strong internal power
over their own rank-and-file (through the control of candidacy selection) such that the
top-level elites normally wield considerable power; closed-list PR systems are powercentralizing.‖ And: Norris. 51.
118

Pippa Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed
Systems," International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (1997). 303 ―voters can only
119
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legislative branch, not the people. Based on the principle of infusion of
powers, those who control who get voted into parliament, also control the
formation of the executive branch. Over and above, ideally, the PM
nominates cabinet members who are approved by parliament.120
However, the consensual part of the Iraqi political system—the concept of
―National Unity‖ Government—gives the respective political entities the
authority to nominate cabinet members.
The chief executive must balance the varying interests of the
political elites since s/he relies on these elites to gain power. On the
other hand, neither the executive nor the legislative branches heed the
people‘s needs since voters are not the source of their power. The
dominant political entities and their party elites are the source of power
in Iraq. Therefore, only these elites‘ interests and agendas are
considered.
The political process in Iraq became a hostage in the hands of
elites.

The entire process lacks transparency and accountability—an

important component of any democratic system.121 Moreover, the system
is not flexible and is not prone to change. The elites tightly control the

select the party, and the ranking of candidates is determined by the political party. The
rank order on the party list determines which candidates are elected.‖
120

Country Profile: Iraq. 17.

Stone. 360 ―the central test of representation is not whether representatives share
demographic characteristics with constituents but whether they are accountable to
their constituents.‖
121

27

system,122 and the system does not allow for elite alterations.123

―The

outcome of each election is a foregone conclusion, leaving only the exact
allocation of parliamentary seats to be decided.‖ 124
As such, a fundamental tenet of democracy—power vested in the
citizens—is missing in Iraq;125 citizens are marginalized or totally
excluded from the process. Thus, people in Iraq living under miserable
circumstances do not have an outlet for their grievances. 126 This
naturally produces tensions and promotes violence.
―Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is unpunished, it is
rewarded;‖127 ―Pessimism is pervasive;‖128 and this negative atmosphere

Allawi. ―gave rise to our sectarian Parliament, controlled by party leaders rather
than by the genuine representatives of the people. They have assembled a government
unaccountable and unanswerable to its people.‖ and:
Pierson. 145 contrary to
Pierson‘s assertion that political actors do not have property rights, parties unlike
people have very long durability.
122

123

Sisk. 20.

124

Hazan.

Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 ). 10
―‗polyarchal democracy‘ installs six distinctive institutions: elected officials; free, fair,
and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information;
associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship … criteria for polyarchal democracy
describe a working process, a series of regularized interactions among citizens and
officials. These go far beyond the usual procedural standards … if a regime operates all
six institutions, it counts as a democracy. If it lacks any of them, or some of them aren't
really working, it doesn't count as a democracy,‖ 11 & 12 ―full-fledged citizenship,
which plays a crucial part in democracy.‖
125

Stone. 360 ―citizens who have no influence over ‗their‘ representatives and no way
to kick them out of office if they do not effectively represent the citizens‘ policy views.‖
& 336 an unrighteous system since ―to bring grievances is absolutely essential to the
function of a rights system.‖
126

127

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 8.

128

Ibid. 9.
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hampers the rule of law, thus forcing Iraqis to join one side or another
out of no choice but to survive.
What makes the situation in Iraq even worse is the nature of the
empowered elites in Iraq.129 Noting that the role of elites and the
distribution of capabilities among these elites determine the course—
success or failure—of transitions from dictatorship:
The centrality of political elites in establishing
and terminating democracy, and deficits in rule of law
and state capacity as the primary challenge to the
quality and survival of new democracies … ranging
from … the origins and design of democracy to its
overall quality and sustainability … There is also
widespread agreement that political elites play a central
role in democratization … In particular, whether there
is a transition from dictatorship to democracy seems to
depend heavily on the interests, values, and actions of
political leaders … If political leaders, for various
reasons, are understood to be the founders of
democracy, then they also often function, after that
initial breakthrough, as its sustainers or its
underminers … Political elites design political
institutions (which affect the quality and, perhaps, the
very survival of democracy).130
The key question for regime paths is the
distribution of liberal and illiberal political groupings
between these two categories and the resources that
mobilized versus demobilized groups command.131

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 83, 85, 86, 87, 100, 122,
& 123 ―the rotating presidency also hindered the GC‘s effectiveness. It had seemed a
necessary compromise when the Council was formed in July. Members found that they
could not agree on any one leader and instead, through a tortuous line of reasoning –
emblematic of the sectarian divides within the body, and Iraq itself—wound up selecting
a nine-man rotating presidency.‖
129

Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,"
Comparative Political Studies (2000;). 703, 707, & 709.
130

131

Ibid. 713.
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The extremist parties that have risen to power in Iraq have a dually
devastating effect. These parties and their elites are identity oriented.132
They capitalize on their sectarian and/or ethnic affiliations in a top down
manner to maintain their power. 133 As such, the elites in Iraq use all the
resources available—their financial resources, militias, 134 the educational
Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss, "The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic
Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics," Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 1
(Mar., 2004). 59 ―Institutions that cultivate values and beliefs; the vitality and
alignment of organizations that transform diffuse groups into coherent political
collectives-e.g., parties, unions; political actors' targeted mobilization and
demobilization efforts; political opportunity structures related to elite cleavages,
propensity for repression, et cetera; and state actions that distribute resources to
political groups.‖ And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 49
―this ethnically, spiritually, and politically disparate group was not accustomed to
cooperation.‖
132

Sisk. 5 ―Post-war environments may be vulnerable to the emergence of wily elites
who will mobilize on divisive nationalist, ethnic, or racial themes in their quest for
power.‖ And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 218 ―Sunni
Baathists fighting Shiite, and Kurdish Militias, and Iraq fragmenting along sectarian
and geographical fault lines.‖ Also see for the role of the elites in transition and
consolidation of democracy: Leonardo Morlino and José Ramón Montero, "Legitimacy
and Democracy in Southern Europe," in The Politics of Democratic Consolidation.
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Richard P. Gunther, P. Nikiforos
Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995 ). 258. And: Mariano Torcal, "The Origins of Democratic Support in PostFranco: Spain: Learning to Be a Democrat under Authoritarian Rule?," in Spain
Transformed. The Late Franco Dictatorship, ed. Nigel Towson (Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007). 198 ―democratic support and non-democratic regime rejection mostly
reflects an attitudinal change springing from the essentially individual political
experience of the transition to, and consolidation of, the new democracy; a change in
which the most important political and social actors and elites play a leading role. The
absence, or failure, of an attempt to politicize the issue of the approval of the preceding
regime and/or the new one by significant political actors is the main explanation for the
existence of this attitudinal change.‖ Also see: Gandhi. And: Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About
Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press: The
Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, 1986). And: Larry Diamond,
Developing Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 163
―Elites (politicians, intellectuals, business and associational leaders, media
practitioners, and so on) typically have distinctive values and norms (and invariably,
more information about the system), and they often lead the way in large-scale value
change.‖
133

Anthony J. Schwarz, Iraq’s Militias: The True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq
(Carlisle: US Army War Colledge, 2007). 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66 ―The militias were
also used to coerce and threaten potential voters. For an example of a militia
134
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system, their position in a government that they tightly control—to
promote their identity-based approach.135 Hence, the elites in Iraq ―have
blocked, derailed, or corrupted the electoral process in attempts to retain

commander using muscle to advance his political agenda one need look no further than
the nomination of Ibrahim Jafari as Prime Minister of Iraq in February 2006. Jafari
served as Prime Minister of the Iraqi Transitional Government during the year prior to
February‘s nomination. The fact that he was broadly ineffective in advancing
government programs and promoting national growth did not stop him from gaining the
initial 2006 nomination. Jafari had the support of Sadr, whose militia threatened to
harm many voting members if Jafari was not nominated in 2006 … Militias in Iraq and
Afghanistan have undermined the political process repeatedly. Although some Iraqi
militias and their affiliated political parties support a broad based disarmament
initiative in principle, they are reluctant to proceed because of political rivalries,
insurgent attacks, ethnic or sectarian violence, and lack of faith in the ability of
national security forces. … militias do not support state institutions. Loyalties lie within
the militia organization only. Even worse, militia members often pervade state security
mechanisms in order to further the militia‘s agenda. Rather than providing security for
a national populace, they have little regard for non-militia members. Militias influence
the Iraqi security forces at all levels, making legitimate national security force units
unable or unwilling to confront them … When they infiltrate government security forces,
as they have in Afghanistan and as has been alleged in Iraq (including the reported Shia
militia death squads comprised of forces within the Iraqi government‘s Ministry of
Interior), militia activity is even more detrimental to security … Certain Iraqi leaders
continue to see the need to utilize militias as an interim solution to quell violence until
national security forces are able to provide decisive security. Some experts believe that
Iraq‘s national party leaders do not have strong beliefs in the long-term political
process, and for this reason, will not push to disband groups they view as effective at
filling immediate security voids. … This original CPA attempt at outlawing militias
lacked political will on the part of Iraqi lawmakers … After the Iraqis assumed full
control of government, a primary security ministry, the Ministry of Interior, was allowed
to fall into the hands of the Badr Corps. Though this private army has since renounced
its militia title and now operates under the auspices of a civic group called the Badr
Organization, common perception was that Bayan Jabr, former Badr Corps leader and
Minister of Interior in 2005, was allowing Badr Corps ideology—if not its leaders
directly—to play a strong role in directing the actions of Iraqi police. Many Shia militia
members have been allowed to place members into army and police units as a way to
serve political interests and gain influence for associated lawmakers. This phenomenon
is especially evident in the Shia dominated south, where militia members have hindered
the implementation of objective law enforcement. Political will is the single most
important aspect of a successful DDR plan targeting militias. … Without a strong and
clear message from the national government, militia activity will continue … The fact
that many militias in Iraq possess political power is significant.‖ And: Biddle, O'Hanlon,
and Pollack. 39.
Mettler and Soss. 58 ―"group-centrism" in mass opinion does not flow directly from
some underlying element of individual or group psychology. Rather, it "depends
importantly on the political context .... The framing of issues-by partisan elites and
mass media organizations shapes public understanding of the roots of contemporary
problems and merits of alternative solutions.‖
135
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power,‖136 and, prevent elite alteration. The result is constant injection
of sectarianism and ethnocentrism in the Iraqi society. 137
These elites are not only mistrustful of each other and do not
compete for power within the democratic system, they also maintain
active military wings that are responsible for much of the violence in
Iraq,138 directly or indirectly.139 The maintenance of military wings and
the contestation over power within the realms of government is affecting
Iraq‘s statehood.140 This must be understood before even addressing the
issue of democracy.141 The interactions of these elites and the resulting
power politics deny the Iraqi state a monopoly over coercive means, and
also deny recognition that the state is the supreme authority and
arbitrator.142 The process also precludes unity of action in the conduct of

136

Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 4.

"Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 857 ―considerable
evidence suggesting that political elites use violence to construct antagonistic ethnic
identities, which in turn favor more violence.‖
And
Stone.: 307 indoctrination
through religious propaganda ―designed to make its audience or subject serve someone
else‘s interests … and rob people‘s capacity to think independently … it relies on
appeals to fear, insecurity, or anxiety, it drives out rational thought.‖ And: Mettler and
Soss. 61 ―policies convey messages about membership to individual citizens, they also
influence patterns of group identity.‖
137

Woodward. 215, 216, and: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
274, 275. And: "Executions Main Cause of Civilian Death During Iraq War," Associated
Press 04/16/ 2009. And: "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'."
138

139

Galbraith. 2 & 6.

Max Fuller, "State-Sanctioned Paramilitary Terror in Basra under British
Occupation",
Center
For
Research
on
Globalization
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9766
(accessed
04/02/
2009). And: "Iraq Kurdish Force 'Beyond Law'."
140

141

Linz and Stepan. 7, 17, 18, & 28.
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foreign affairs,143 since each party lobbies for outside support to gain
leverage in its internal struggle. Thus, the actions of these elites are not
only jeopardizing the prospects of democracy in Iraq, but are also
endangering the Iraqi state itself.
Moreover, such a fierce power dispute has made it virtually
impossible to take vital steps necessary to stabilize Iraq—i.e., national
reconciliation projects, demobilization, disintegration and reintegration
(DDR), and, the rule of law—without constant external pressure from
coalition countries.144

The political system in Iraq has become like

entrenched warfare.
Third, reducing Iraq to a single electoral district 145 further
facilitated the formation of the Iraqi political arena along sectarian and

Tilly. 11 ―the features of states as ―organizations that control the major
concentration of coercive means within a substantial territory, exercises priority in
some regards over all other organizations operating within the same territory, and
receive acknowledgment of that priority from other organizations, including states,
outside the territory.‖
142

Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in
New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael Doyle and John Ikenberry.
These elites have also hampered Iraq‘s ability to conduct foreign affairs as a state.
These elites compete for support outside of Iraq also, while states are expected to
―posses the capacity of unity of action. This means that states have the capacity to act
in coherent manner with regard to other countries. Cohesive in turn means that
central decision making maintain sufficient control over different organizational
elements of their governments to allow them direct and coordinate government actions
in such a way as to implement the decision making strategies, and to do so in a way
that reflects their rank-ordering their goals. Thus endowed with the capacity for
coherent action in support of a centrally established and consistent hierarchy of goals.‖
143

144

Allawi. And: Gordon and Trainor. 476.

145

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 367.
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ethnic lines.146 In Iraq, Kurds are concentrated in the north, Sunnis in
the center and western parts of the country, and, Shiite in the south.
Therefore, without having to compete in small districts—hence, against
entities of the same sect and ethnicity—extremist parties were able to
form political coalitions that are homogenous.147 This facilitates and
rewards political entities for capitalizing on identities as credentials to
win elections, and has so far punished those who refuse to invoke such
credentials as means to win elections. The result is that the three major
blocs that account for the vast majority of votes, are characterized as
Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.148 This situation was further exacerbated when
the Iraqi state was dissolved, and people naturally returned to their subidentities, for protection.149

Mettler and Soss. 58 ―we must look beyond the individual to the communication
flows citizens receive from political elites and mass media … common patterns of
political thinking in mass publics can be viewed as politically constructed outcomes …
In this view, partisan loyalties are more than socialized identities or instrumental
allegiances; they are also, as Martin Shefter argues, political achievements constructed
by innovative organizations that actively seek to attract mass followings.‖ And: 60 &
61 ―Policies can alter preferences and perceptions of self-interest, shape basic beliefs
about the nature of social reality, mobilize or pacify constituencies, and foment
rebellion or serve to legitimate existing governmental and distributive arrangements …
In some cases, public policies create, sustain, or deepen group divisions, even though
the relevant groups may be defined on the basis of shared physical characteristics,
cultural beliefs, or locales of residence. Indeed, policy designs not only can affect the
ways a target group is viewed in the society at large; they also can influence how group
members perceive and evaluate one another‖
146

Pierson. 114&115 long term institutional effects may be better treated as byproducts rather than goals of institutional designers … unanticipated consequences are
of tremendous significance in modern polities.‖ And: Galbraith. 6.
147

Allawi. ―The vast majority of the electorate based their choices on sectarian and
ethnic affiliations, not on genuine political platforms.‖ And: Galbraith. 3. And: Sodaro.
263.
148

149

Galbraith. 8, 9, & 90.
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Consequently, as mistrust and competitions characterized the
relation among elites, accounts have come to be settled on the streets of
Iraq through violence.150 Furthermore, to secure as much public support
as possible to be leveraged in this power struggle, 151 some entities have
rallied people based on their sectarian identities,152 some based on their
ethnic identities,153 and, others by promoting struggle against an
occupier.154 This is a direct result of the system that does not force elites
and political entities to secure cross-factional support to gain power.
Hence, factional violence in Iraq is elite-led, and inflamed in a top-down
approach.155

Mettler and Soss. 59 ―Likewise, group identification and consciousness do not
simply emerge for individuals or social groups; they get organized into or out of the
political process. As Adam Przeworski explains, ‗If political parties do not mobilize
people qua workers ... then workers are less likely to identify themselves as class
members and, eventually, less likely to vote as workers.‘‖
150

"Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 583 ―Strategic
action by elites. What the pre-constructivist literature on ethnic conflict termed ‗elite
theories of ethnic violence‘ provides promising grounds for a constructivist theory of
ethnic violence in this sense… In these arguments, ethnic violence is explained as both
a means and a by-product of political elites' efforts to hold or acquire power. Elites
foment ethnic violence to build political support; this process has the effect of
constructing more antagonistic identities, which favors more violence.‖
151

152

Ibid. 583.

153

Ibid. 583.

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 287 Sherif Hussien Bin
Ali‘s comment regarding the Sunni insurgency ―They do not oppose the coalition or the
Americans, But they feel left out.‖
154

"Review: Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." 583 ―the content
and boundary rules of ethnic categories might be constructed by the actions of
individuals seeking various ends. Consider, for example, the proposition that ethnic
violence occurs when political elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities in order to
strengthen their hold on power. In this approach, the insights of a "constructivist"
approach merge with, or become hard to distinguish from, a rationalist or strategic
155
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Fourth, on the government level, the consensual requirement and
proportional representation brought these hardened identity-based elites
together to share power and governance in Iraq.156 Iraq today retains an
informal ―consociational‖ political system. 157 This consociationalism in

choice approach.‖ And: Morlino and Montero. 258 ―divisive, opportunistic behavior of
party elites, now of greater visibility (if not intrusiveness) in the television age.‖
Pierson. 104 unanticipated consequences of the designed system by the CPA and
the UN. And: Woodward.
156

Pippa Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do PowerSharing Institutions Work? (Harvard University, 2005). 3 &4 ―the thesis is that powersharing regimes encourage group cooperation (at best), and avoid outright ethnic
rebellion (at worst), in plural societies divided into distinct linguistic, religious,
nationalistic, and/or cultural communities … Consociationalism is designed to produce
a stable political system due to elite cooperation despite social segmentation … four
characteristics of ‗consociational‘ constitutions as an ideal-type: executive power-sharing
among a ‗grand coalition‘ of political leaders drawn from all significant segments of
society; a minority veto in government decision-making, requiring mutual agreement
among all parties in the executive; proportional representation of major groups in elected
and appointed office; and a high degree of cultural autonomy for groups … such regimes
need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that
includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority …‘
The theory of consociationalism emphasizes the importance of governing incentives
which work through a ‗top-down‘ two-stage process. First, power-sharing arrangements
are thought to mitigate conflict among leadership elites. ‘Consociational democracy
means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented
political culture into a stable democracy.’ These arrangements are designed to maximize
the number of ‗stakeholders‘ who share an interest in playing by the rules of the game.
This process is exemplified by proportional electoral systems with low vote thresholds
which usually produce multiparty parliaments, with many minor parties each
representing distinct segmented communities. In this context, party leaders have an
incentive to bargain and collaborate with other factions in parliament in order to gain
office in governing coalitions … all plural societies containing distinct ethnic
communities divided by language, religion, and region, with constitutions characterized
by multiple veto-points and extensive power-sharing.‖ And: Arend Lijphart,
"Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (April,
2004). 96 & 97 ―the constitutional needs of countries with deep ethnic and other
cleavages. In such deeply divided societies the interests and demands of communal
groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power sharing … deep
societal divisions pose a grave problem for democracy, and that it is therefore generally
more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in divided than in
homogeneous countries … the successful establishment of democratic government in
divided societies requires two key elements: power sharing and group autonomy. Power
sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups
in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means
that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the
areas of education and culture. These two characteristics are the primary attributes of
157
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Iraq

has

hindered

democratic

consolidation.158

Furthermore,

consociationalism in Iraq has created, reinforced, and ―frozen group
boundaries,‖159 because it shaped institutions and provided incentives
for actors competing for power to adopt identity politics. Naturally, the
result is political stalemate.160 Former CIA Director General Michael
Hayden stated:
The government is unable to govern … we have
spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a
government that is balanced, and it cannot function.
The Inability of the government to govern seems
irreversible. We have placed all our energies in creating
a center, and the center cannot accomplish anything. 161

The Coalition Provincial Authority, after consulting the UN 162 and
capitalizing on ―constitutional experts‖ detached from the specificities of
the Iraqi context,163 sought to address the prospects of power struggle in

the kind of democratic system that is often referred to as power-sharing democracy or,
to use a technical political-science term, ―consociational‖ democracy.‖ Also see:
Kenneth N. Brown, Cutting the Grodian Knot: Formation of a Consociational Government
for Post Saddam Iraq (U.S. Army War College). And: Sodaro. 188 & 189
Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do PowerSharing Institutions Work? 2 ――Consociationalism‘ has always proved controversial.‖
158

Ibid. 2. Furthermore: parties in Iraq applied the principle of consociation to their
own ―homogenous‖ coalitions to overcome the zero-sum game that defines the relations
among parties—even of those who have the same identity.
159

Blais. 242 ―It is more difficult for the Cabinet to hold together as a unity when the
government is a coalition‖ this is without mentioning that the coalitional is formed by
political entities of hardened identities. And: Galbraith. 3. Also see: Hazan. 23
―without a consensus on national priorities, immobilism set in and the government
became one of national paralysis.‖
160

Woodward. 217, 221 ―Hayden had been adamant about the Iraqi government‘s
inability to govern,‖ & 222 Lee Hamilton‘s remarks.
161

162

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 78, 244, 279, & 281.
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Iraq by laying the foundation for national unity government in Iraq
through consensus.164
The designers of the Iraqi political system overlooked the
questions: Who will be included by devising such a system? And,
National unity and consensus among whom? They introduced a system
of sectarian and ethnic quotas in Iraq 165 instead of a national unity
government built on consensus. The effects of establishing sectarian and
ethnic quotas was that it brought about a gathering mainly of
fundamental ethnic and sectarian groups in a so-called representative
governing system.166

This system was emplaced in spite of Bremer‘s

recognition that such a system ―can lead to paralysis.‖167
This sectarian and ethnic quota system with its consensus focus
became the basis upon which the Iraqi political process was built. 168 It is
Pierson. 112 ―‘constitutional experts‘ or ‗provisions merchants‘ ‗called in to help
design systems in lands from homes,‘ … ‗simply bring along their usual tool kits‘ … in
short particular arrangements may well be adopted because they are perceived to be
appropriate.‖
163

164

Galbraith. 3.

Pierson. 104 unanticipated consequences of the system devised in Iraq. And: Mettler
and Soss. 58 ―Whoever decides what the game is about decides also who gets into the
game.‖ And: Jamal, (accessed). And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a
Future of Hope. Paul Bremer knew that this system could favor extremists 87, 89, 93,
218, 226 ―elections … could favor the best organized political parties, including
Islamists,‖ & 242.
165

166

Hall and Taylor. 941 ―how institutions create paths.‖

167

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 213.

Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet. And: Pierson. 120 & 121 even if the institutions will
outlive the actors, in such a system of heavy reliance on political entities the adverse
effects will endure, since, parties unlike people have a much longer life.
168
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imperative to note the importance of timing and the sequencing of
events. These factors played ―a critical role‖ since the ―early parts of a
sequence matter much more than later parts,‖ 169 and the ―final
destination depends on the path.‖170 Thus, the head start given to such
elites and political entities, and the designed system and sequence of
events—along with the speed with which they were rushed in,171—
account for many of the problems in Iraq since the regime change.172
The consequences are that the UN and the CPA brought in a group
of exiles, mainly of rigid religious and ethnic identities,173 and provided
them with all the resources and power that government can provide to
pursue their struggle for power.174

169

Pierson. 44.

Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America. 51.
170

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 225 & 293. And: Sodaro.
267.
171

Pierson. 13, 18, 19, 31, 39, 44, 45, 55, 56, 60 ―tremendous power rests in those who
select the sequence design the system gained,‖ & 71 ―initiating a process.‖
172

March and Olsen. 744 ―symbolic behavior is also a strategic element in political
competition. Individuals and groups are frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths
without believing them and while violating their implications. In particular, a serious
theoretical understanding of myths, symbols, and rituals must include some attention
to the dynamics of symbols, to the processes by which symbols shape the behavior not
only of the innocent but of the society as a whole.‖
173

Conducting a Conflict Assessment - a Framework for Strategy and Program
Development, (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2005). 22 ―While certain groups may
have an incentive for violence, the question remains as to whether they have the means
to do so. Do these groups have the organizational capacity necessary to sustain
violence? Do they have access to money and weapons, and on what scale? Do they have
international backers? Are there pools of recruits they can draw on? Without these
174
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The above-stated and unanticipated consequences of the system
designed by the CPA and the UN created ―path dependence,‖ 175 and
―positive feedbacks‖176 for the emerging political elites.

In a nutshell,

these elites saw their interests being served by such a system.

Hence, a

loop of ―self reinforcing‖ 177 mechanisms lead these elites to preserve this
system that serves well their entrenched interests. 178 Embarking on such
an opportunity,179 these elites and political entities naturally codified
their interests, factionalism, and fragmentation, in the constitution 180

resources, no matter how deeply felt a grievance or overwhelming the desire for
economic or political gain, incentives for violence cannot find expression. The second
major category therefore focuses on whether people with incentives for violence have
access to the resources they need to turn that incentive into sustained violence.‖
Pierson. 11 ―path dependence exemplify ‗historical causation‘ in which dynamics
triggered by an event or process at one point in time reproduce themselves even in the
absence of the recurrence of the original event or process.‖ & 13 ―the significance of the
beginning‖ &18.
175

Mettler and Soss. 60 ―‗policy feedback‘ refers to the ways ‗policies, once enacted,
restructure subsequent political processes.‘ … two kinds of feedback effects: new
policies may transform state capacities by creating, building upon, or undercutting
administrative arrangements; and they may affect the identities, political goals, and
capabilities of social groups.‖
176

Pierson. 145 &146 ―the same set of actors who would lose influence as the result of
an institutional reform must agree to any revision one would naturally expect a higher
level of institutional resilience.‖ Thus, this has lead to ―self-referencing,‖ where
institutional revision is hostage in the hands of the actors who control these
institutions, and benefit out of them.
177

178

Ibid. 10 & 105 ―particular institutions exist because it is expected to serve interests.‖

Ibid. 60 ―because the sequence in which alternative proposals are considered
determines the eventual outcome, tremendous power rests with those actors who select
the sequence.‖ 62 ―the causal story is not about temporal order at all—it is about the
institutional structure and the resources and preferences of the key strategic actors.
Sequence reveals how powerful actors get what they want.‖
179

Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The Iraqi Constitution: Potentially Fatal Flaw", The Brookings
Institution
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0902iraq_ohanlon.aspx
(accessed). and, Jonathan Morrow, "Weak Viability: The Iraqi Federal State and the
180
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and institutionalized their behaviors.181

Through such means, these

elites ―shifted the rules in their favor … and increased their own
capacities for political action while diminishing those of their rivals … to
reinforce their trends.‖182 Hence, these elites designed, wielded power,
and determined the shape and characteristic of the entire state through
the ―structure of rules‖ that bound actors even beyond the reach of the
elites, formalizing their approach.183 This minimizes the possibilities for
change in Iraq since this accounts for the resilience of the institutions
that this paper is advocating to reform. 184 Therefore, unless this system
is reformed to promote moderation and unity, and unclog the political
system, Iraq does not have a chance to become a stable, unified, and
democratic

country.185

Life

support

machines—coalition

military

presence and diplomatic pressure—will always be necessary;186 otherwise
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http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr168.html (accessed 10/21 2008).
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Michael E. O'Hanlon, (accessed). And: Morrow, (accessed).
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Pierson. 36.
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Ibid. 60.
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Ibid. 106 ―particular institutions may be functional for powerful actors but quite
dysfunctional for society as a whole.‖ 142, 143, & 144.
184

March and Olsen. 735 ―Historically, political theory has treated political institutions
as determining, ordering, or modifying individual motives, and as acting autonomously
in terms of institutional needs‖
185

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 8 ―include milestones that can
strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people … If the Iraqi government
demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of
milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance‖ 16 ―Maliki has publicly
rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of
blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and resisted
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Iraqi and international efforts will fail, resources will be wasted, 187 and
the world will suffer dire consequences of such a failure, as this study
demonstrates in its conclusion.
For all of these reasons, the situation in Iraq is as it is today.188 So
far, and after more than six years, not a single goal of the original
objective of OIF has been achieved.

Moreover, after all the invested

efforts, and costs, still an understanding among the Iraqi elites on basic
issues like the accountability and reconciliation law—also known as
Debathification,—the revenue sharing law, a genuine and proper DDR,
etc., are not attained. What makes this picture even gloomier is that the
goals, ideologies, and, agendas of the majority of these entities runs
counter to the American objective in Iraq. As such, the political process

U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias.‖ 19
―Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of militias, he has
taken little meaningful action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to
Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.‖
Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated
that: ―Observers not steeped in Iraqi history might be bemused to find that six years
after the toppling of a dictator, after the death of several hundred thousand Iraqis, a
brutal insurgency, trillions of wasted dollars and more than 4,000 dead US soldiers, the
country is being rebuilt along very familiar lines: concentration of power, shadowy
intelligence services and corruption.‖
187

Conducting a Conflict Assessment - a Framework for Strategy and Program
Development. 31 ―conflict is extremely complex. It doesn't occur simply because people
are unhappy or greedy or because a country happens to have the resources in place
that might sustain violence. Nor does it happen everywhere state and social institutions
are weak or perverse. It happens when causes found at multiple levels come together
and reinforce each other. Ultimately the product of deep grievance, political and
economic competition, irresponsible political leadership, weak and unaccountable
institutions, and global and regional forces.‖
188
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in Iraq became the major obstacle in achieving the strategic objective of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Given what has been discussed and documented this far, one
cannot help but ask whether Iraq is a democracy, or even on the path to
becoming a democracy?

The unfortunate answer to both questions is

no.189 Then, another issue surfaces: If Iraq is not a democracy, why not?

Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13,
no. 1 (January 2002). Iraq holds the worst characteristics of feckless pluralism, and
some characteristics of dominant power politics: 9, 10, 11 & 15 ―have some attributes of
democratic political life … regular elections and democratic constitutions. Yet they
suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of citizens‘
interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by
government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, and very low levels of public
confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by the
state… As a first analytic step, two broad political syndromes can be seen to be
common in the gray zone … The first syndrome is feckless pluralism … where
democracy remains shallow and troubled. Political participation, though broad at
election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the major parties or
groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The
alternation of power seems only to trade the country‘s problems back and forth from
one hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely
perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about working for their
country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, and … extremely unhappy
about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt,
elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally
little respect. And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly
conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or even
calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and successive
governments are unable to make headway on most of the major problems facing the
country, from crime and corruption to health, education, and public welfare generally …
There are many variations of feckless pluralism. In some cases, the parties that
alternate power between them are divided by paralyzing acrimony and devote their time
out of power to preventing the other party from accomplishing anything at all … In
other cases, the main competing groups end up colluding, formally or informally,
rendering the alternation of power unhelpful in a different manner … In some countries
afflicted with feckless pluralism, the political competition is between deeply entrenched
parties that essentially operate as patronage networks and seem never to renovate
themselves, … These varied cases nonetheless share a common condition that seems at
the root of feckless pluralism—the whole class of political elites, though plural and
competitive, are profoundly cut off from the citizenry, rendering political life an
ultimately hollow, unproductive exercise…‖ As for dominant power politics Iraq retains
the following characteristics ―… the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling
party (or ruling political forces). The state‘s main assets—that is to say, the state as a
source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and police power—are
189
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And, why have all these efforts failed to produce the desired results? The
answer is that the efforts have not produced a democracy because of the
mischaracterization of the root cause of the problem in Iraq as stated
earlier. Strategies that aim to answer the problems in Iraq and fulfill the
strategic objective of OIF must correctly assess the nature of the
problems in order to formulate the way forward.
The conflict in Iraq is largely understood to be sectarian or ethnic,
when this conflict is actually and overwhelmingly a power struggle.
Moreover, the dominant elites in Iraq, and the political system that has
been emplaced in Iraq, neither allow for consolidation of democracy, nor
even for stability. Therefore, the system implemented in Iraq has failed
because it presupposes that:
To preserve their position in government …
community leaders are thought to promote conciliation
among their followers and to encourage acceptance of
the settlement. Under these arrangements, each
gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party … the blurring of the line between
the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces). The state‘s main assets—that is
to say, the state as a source of money, jobs, public information (via state media), and
police power—are gradually put in the direct service of the ruling party… In many
―transitional countries,‖ reasonably regular, genuine elections are held but political
participation beyond voting remains shallow and governmental accountability is weak.
The wide gulf between political elites and citizens in many of these countries turns out
to be rooted in structural conditions, such as the concentration of wealth or certain
socio-cultural traditions that elections themselves do not overcome. It is also striking
how often electoral competition does little to stimulate the renovation or development of
political parties in many gray-zone countries.‖ So Iraq is a combination of feckless
pluralism, and Dominant Power Politics, where it combines the negative connotations of
both. And: Terry L. Mitchell, "Is Iraq a Real Democracy?", The American Chronicle
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/98275 (accessed 04/13/ 2009). ―I
have a hard time buying into the notion that Iraq is a true democracy. Yes, since the
U.S. forced Saddam Hussein from power, Iraq has conducted free and open elections
and has selected its own leaders. However, there´s more to a democracy than just
elections, and I see Iraq as lacking in some of the other things that make a democracy a
democracy. Two of them specifically lead me to question that country´s status as such.‖
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distinct religious, linguistic or nationalistic community,
it is argued, will feel that their voice counts and the
rules of the game are fair and legitimate, as their
leaders are in a position to express their concerns and
protect their interests within the legislature and within
government.190

In Iraq, the elites have instigated the violence, not the masses.
Such a system would provide a remedy for a conflict that is mass-lead;
not for a conflict that is lead by self-absorbed elites, which would prey
even on masses from their own identities to strengthen their positions.191
Therefore, such a system does not answer to the problems in Iraq.
Tarik Al-Hashimi the Vice President of Iraq, called for ―the
restructuring of the Presidency Council and Cabinet by doing away with
the sectarian quota.‖192

Al-Hashimi ―called for the formation of a

national salvation government based on patriotism and away from
sectarianism … He said: ‗We have to move quickly, and I place before my
fellow Iraqi citizens and politicians an urgent salvation plan to end the

Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do PowerSharing Institutions Work? 4.
190

Duss and Juul. 1 ―The elections and their aftermath promise to be contentious and
potentially bloody as Iraq‘s three main ethnic and religious groups—the minority Kurds
and Sunni Arabs and the majority Shia Arabs—vie for power. More troubling still,
factions within each of these ethnic and sectarian groups will contend for power in the
regions they dominate—using local patronage and control of Iraq‘s resources, revenues,
and guns, as well as appeals based on longstanding religious traditions in Iraq … three
dominant and fiercely independent Shia political organizations—the Da‘wa Party, the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, and the Sadrists, along with the smaller but
still significant Fadhila—will attempt through the ballot box and armed conflict to
secure a majority of Shia votes in Iraq in order to lead the country‘s Shia-majority
provinces.‖
191

192

Jamal, (accessed).
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distribution of posts (according to sects, religions and identity) for the
sake of a wider participation.‘‖193
As such, without reforming the existing political system and
electoral process to answer to the Iraqi context‘s specificities, and
without changing the dominant forces in Iraq and the way politics in Iraq
are undertaken today, Iraq‘s best hedge for lasting stability is the
reversion to autocracy. The Iraq Study Group concluded that ―the Iraqi
people could be subjected to another strongman who flexes the political
and military muscle required to impose order amid anarchy. 194 Freedoms
could

be

lost.‖195

Furthermore,

Paul

Bremer

acknowledged

that

compromise on such elements of democracy as a ―professional, and
uncorrupted police force, human rights … no militias‖,196 none of which
has been successfully attained, can lead the situation in Iraq to ―descend
into chaos or civil war or tyranny—or all three.‖197
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"Iraqi V.P. Calls for Forming Nat''L Gov''T to Salvage Country", (accessed).

Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated
that: ―Al-Maliki is running a government inside a government", bypassing ministers and
parliament … a dictatorship - everything is run by his office and advisers, he is
surrounded by his party and clan members. They form a tight knot that is running Iraq
now. He is not building a country, he is building a state for his own party and his own
people.‖
194
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III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 28.
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To cite an example in recent history, Iraq‘s best hope under the
current setup is to develop along the lines of Russia‘s transition after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.198 The obsession of the Russian elites with
their selfish power and interests199 is similar to the picture this study is
drawing about the dominant Iraqi elites.
In 1991, 70% of the Russian population was ―prepared to see
Russia move toward a liberal democracy.‖ 200 Many of the Russian people
―were unsure what exactly democracy was, but they accepted it as both
an idea and as a way of life.‖201 As developments took place, uncertainty
and instability became rampant, the Russian people‘s main concerns
came to be safety, wellbeing, order, and, stability.202

The outcome is

that, in 2006, 71% of Russians regretted the dissolution of the USSR, 203
and, supported and embraced the reversal of the democratization
process.204 Iraqis also wanted to see a democratic Iraq. 205 From dancing

198

Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30

Lilia Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsim and Putin Legacies (Carnegie
Endowment For International Peace, 2007). 10 ―Yeltsin and his ruling team … not only
did they not try to establish a new national consensus on democratic reforms, their
egocentrism deepened the divisions within the society, goading elites into warring
among themselves over who was to get their hands on property and power … the elite
that rose to the top after the collapse of the USSR was split into competing groups each
claiming monopoly on power.‖
199

200

Ibid. 13.
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Ibid. 16.
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in the streets and welcoming Americans as liberators to where Iraq is
today,206 the resemblance with the Russian people‘s shift in mood is
stark.
There is a particular characteristic of the Russian transition‘s end
result which would be particularly repellent to America. The Russian dedemocratization207 came hand-in-hand with a casting aside of all the
policies of ―Western integration.‖208
vision

that

is

characterized

by

Russia is currently promoting a
anti-western

hegemony,209 if not outright anti-Americanism.210

and

anti-American

This anti-Western

stance resonates with many Russians211 because the Russian transition
was seen by ordinary Russians as a Western and an American initiative.
205

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 204.

Sodaro. 259 ―public acceptance—which was fairly high after among Iraqis in the first
months after the war—deteriorated rapidly.‖
206

Tilly. 14 ―Democratization means net 'involvement toward broader, more equal, more
protected, and more binding consultation. De-democratization, obviously, then meansnet movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding
consultation.‖ & 15 ―Net movement of a regime toward the higher ends of the four
dimensions—breadth of popular inclusion, equality among citizens, protection against
arbitrary actions of the states, mutually binding consultation among the state and the
citizenry—qualifies as democratization. Net movement toward the lower ends qualifies
as de-democratization.‖ Also see: Carothers. 9-14.
207

Dmitri Trenin, "The Lonely Power: Russian Security Policy and the West", Carnegie
Endowment
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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22683&prog=
zru&zoom_highlight=Russian (accessed 03/03/ 2009).
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The consequences felt by the Russians were daunting,212 leading them to
blame the west and America for their misfortunes.213

Iraqis likewise see

the Americans as the driving force behind the change, and attribute the
consequences—good or bad—largely to such an intervention.214

Of

course in the case of Iraq, America‘s direct military intervention has
understandably

evoked

the

conclusion

that

America

is

indeed

responsible for the change and its consequences.215
It is highly unlikely that any American decision-maker would like
to see an outcome similar to the one in Russia, in the heart of the Middle
East, in a predominantly Arab and Muslim country.

Such an anti-

American posture in this vital but volatile region can prove to be a very
consequential issue. Just as in the case of the Russian drift away from
democracy, it would be an unfortunate and devastating development for
America. Not to mention, what a terrible waste of numerous lives and
enormous efforts and resources such a scenario in the case of Iraq would
represent.
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Gomart. 5 & 6.

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 112 ―every adult Iraq had
indeed been shocked and awed by the speed and precision with which the coalition had
crushed Saddam Hussien‘s vaunted Republican Guard and overthrown the Baathis
regime. After such a display of superpower might, many expected us to similar miracles
once the tanks stopped rolling.‖ The failure to do so increased ―the resolve and
confidence of Iraqi insurgents and terrorists.‖ & 160 ―the Iraqi minister of Justice
Hashim Al-Shibli stated ‗please remember this, Ambassador Bremer: we are looking the
United States in building a New Iraq.‖
214

215

Sodaro. 267.
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Chapter III:
History—A Source For Lessons And Remedies

Iraq today finds itself faced with problems similar to those faced by
the United States of America after its Declaration of Independence216 and
the formation of the confederation.217 Just as rampant factional interests
threatened America,218 factional interests in Iraq today are, at best,
threatening the prospects of a democratic Iraq, if not Iraq as a nation.
The type of government created under the American Articles of
Confederation was too weak, and the union was malfunctioning.219 The
states were failing to comply with their duties under the Articles of
Confederation.220 Many Americans realized that the survival of the
United States of America and its prosperity was contingent upon
solidifying and strengthening the union.221 General George Washington
wrote:

Jack P. Greene, Colonies to Nation 1763-1789 a Documentary History of the American
Revolution (New York . London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1975). 428 ―The First
National Constitution: The Articles of Confederation (Mar. 1, 1781).‖
216

Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution a History (Modern Library, Random House
Publishing Group, 2002). 71.
217

Greene. 436 The states from their side also failed to comply with their duties under
the Articles of Confederation.
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Ibid. 436 ―The time of … Political Probation‖: George Washington‘s circular letter to
the States (June 8, 1783).
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It appears to me there is an option still left to the
United States of America … whether they will become
respectable and prosperous, or contemptible and
miserable, as a nation… this is the moment to establish
or ruin their national character forever; this is the
favorable moment to give such a tone to our federal
government, as we‘ll enable it to answer the ends of its
institutions, or this may be the ill-fated moment for
relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the
cement of the confederation, and exposing us to become
the sports of European politics … according to the
system of policy the states shall adopt at this moment,
they will stand or fall; and by their confirmation or
lapse it is yet to be decided, whether the revolution
must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse
… not to the present age alone, for with our fate will the
destiny of unborn millions be involved … silence in me
would be a crime … it will be part of my duty, and that
of every true patriot, to assert without reserve, and to
insist … that unless the States will suffer congress to
those prerogatives they are undoubtedly invested with
by the constitution, everything must very rapidly tend
to anarchy and confusion. That it is indispensable to
the happiness of the individual states, that there
should be lodged somewhere a supreme power to
regulate and govern the general concerns of the
confederated republic ….222

It is puzzling that American policymakers failed to draw such
parallels and apply, to Iraq, lessons learned from the American
experience.223 It is even more puzzling that bright politicians like Vice
President Joseph R. Biden Jr. advocated, in 2006, a solution to the
overall problems in Iraq that would promote more factionalism by further
dividing the country into distinct Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurdish regions. 224

Ibid. 437–444 ―The time of … Political Probation‖: George Washington‘s circular
letter to the States (June 8, 1783).
222

"Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government." ―Maliki said ‗Iraq needs to change
its laws and constitution to be able to defend its unity.‘‖
223

Joseph R. Biden Jr., "A Plan to Hold Iraq Together," The Washington Post, 08/24/
2006.
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This is the exact opposite of the measures that America undertook to
overcome a very similar situation—to revise the Articles of Confederation
and establish a government ―adequate to the exigencies of the Union.‖225
Had America‘s founding fathers approached the problems facing
their country in the way that American strategists and policymakers are
approaching the problems facing Iraq, America as we know it would not
have survived. Instead, the founding fathers of America were prudent
enough to devise a system that transformed a loose union into a strong
unified nation. As such, America arose from a country that was unable
to raise money to meet its financial obligations226 and raise arms to
defend itself,227 to become a superpower.
Given the challenges Iraq is facing today—the nature of its elites,
the characteristics of its political system, the fate of Iraqi citizens, and
the outcome of its experience so far—there are two lessons to be drawn
from the American experience during its first century. These lessons are

Winton U. Solberg, The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990). 55 & 59 ―Proceedings of the
Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government.‖ See also: 60 & 61 ―The
Virginia Resolution October 16, 1786;‖ & 62 ―The Delaware Resolution February 3,
1787.‖
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Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 12," in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 75 & 76 and: Alexander Hamilton,
"Federalist No. 13," in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press, 1961). 80.
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John Jay, "Federalist No. 5," in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown:
Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 26 & 27 and: Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No.
6," in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press,
1961). 35 and: Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 7 " in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E.
Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 36 & 37.
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fundamental to defining the future of Iraq and the course of its nascent
democratic experience: First, like America, Iraq must consolidate and
strengthen its political system and its fragmented government. This will
enable Iraq‘s government to rise to the challenges it faces, and to look
after the interests of the people it represents, rather than being torn by
bickering faction, as is the case in Iraq now. It is absolutely essential for
the sustainability of the Iraqi democratic experience, like American, Iraq
must protect against a backlash, consolidate its political system, and
advance democracy.

In short, such a measure is vital for the Iraqi

experiment to succeed. Otherwise, prospects of democratization in Iraq
will suffer severe setbacks, for, either Iraq will be subjected to another
brutal dictator, or it will become the ―sports‖ 228 of other countries. Just,
as General George Washington explained, in his circular letter, how such
a measure was important for the survival of America, the same applies
today for Iraq. It is time to decide on the future of Iraq. Is Iraq to be a
consolidated democracy? Dissolve into chaos and anarchy? Or will it
revert

to dictatorship?229 A choice must be made: Iraqis must

Greene. 437– 444 ―The time of … Political Probation‖: George Washington‘s circular
letter to the States (June 8, 1783).
228

"21: Nuri Al-Maliki: Prime Minister, Iraq," Newsweek, 12/20/ 2008. And: Sam
Dagher, "A Top Sunni Survives an Attack in Iraq " The New York Times, 01/21/ 2009.
―Maliki's partners in government, both Shiites and Kurds, accuse him of adopting an
increasingly autocratic style.‖ And: Ned Parker, "Kurdish Leader Sees Authoritarian
Drift in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 01/11/ 2009. And: Abdul-Ahad. Three officers from
the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INSI) stated that: ―We compile reports on their
activities, generals' and military units' movements, and their corruption, the positions
they are taking in the government and the contracts they are obtaining. But we don't
know what to do with these reports because we don't trust the government.‖
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―establish‖230 or ―ruin their national character forever;‖

231

they must

enable their government ―to answer the ends of its institutions, or this
may be the ill-fated moment for relaxing its powers.‖232
In the mean-time, just as General George Washington warned, the
suggested consolidation must avoid the oppression that occurs by
vesting too much power in single government that presides over the
whole of Iraq.233

And, as Benjamin Rush explains ―absolute power

should never be trusted to man. It has perverted the wisest heads, and
corrupted the best hearts in the world.‖234 In this respect, the
responsibilities and powers must be assigned to different government
branches.235 Each branch must have the means to check the conduct of
the remaining two branches, and balance their authority.236
The second lesson to be drawn from the American experience
during its first century is that it is absolutely essential for the
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government to rely on the will of people. 237

As James Madison—the

father of the American Constitution—stated: ―it is essential to liberty that
the government in general should have a common interest with the
people.‖238 Given the characteristics of the Iraqi context, the government
should be directly accountable to the people.

This will ameliorate the

vice of factional interests by accounting for the individual interests of
citizens.
Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg address, summarized the
importance of having the government rely for its power on the people and
how such a government empowered by the people will enjoy durability
and realize its goals:
That we here highly resolve that these dead shall
not have died in vain--that this nation … shall have a
new birth of freedom—and that government of the
people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish
from the earth.239

The following Chapter proposes a system that will minimize
factionalism while ensuring the widest possible popular participation.
The government in the proposed system relies on the widest possible

Ibid. 347 & 359 The preamble, Article 1, Section 1 & Article VI [The Constitution of
the United States] the US constitution provided the remedy by empowering the people
over the states in the House of Representatives and through its supremacy clause.
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White
(accessed

House
04/10/

support of the citizens; at the same time, it guarantees unity of command
that is checked by institutional oversight.
Such measures will break the tight control of elites over Iraq, and
break the ongoing clientelistic240 patterns of despotism carried on from
previous eras.

The goal, opportunity and challenge central to this

chapter and, indeed, the entire study best captured in Richard Price‘s
letter

―‗A New Prospect in Human Affairs‘ … ‗Observation on the

importance of the American Revolution‘ (1784):‖
That the members of a civil community are …
not subjects; and their rulers, servants, not masters.—
And that all legitimate government consists in the
dominion of equal laws made with common consent;
that is, in the dominion of men over themselves; and
not in the dominion of communities over communities,
or of any men over other men … The Present moment,
however auspicious to the united States if wisely
approved, is critical; and, though apparently the end of
all their dangers, may prove the time their greatest
danger … Should … excessive jealousy district their
governments; and, clashing interests, subject to no
controul, break the federal union—the consequences
will be, that he fairest experiment ever tried in human
affairs will miscarry; and that a REVOLUTION which
had revived the hopes of good men and promised an
opening to better times, will become a discouragement
to all future efforts in favour of liberty, and prove only
Brian Kermath, "What Is Cliemtelism?", University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
http://www.uwsp.edu/cnr/gem/ambassador/what_is_clientelism.htm
(accessed
04/10/ 2009). ―Clientelism refers to a form of social organization common in many
developing regions characterized by ‗patron-client‘ relationships. In such places,
relatively powerful and rich ‗patrons‘ promise to provide relatively powerless and poor
‗clients‘ with jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits in exchange for votes
and other forms of loyalty including labor … these relationships are typically
exploitative, often resulting in the perpetual indebtedness of the clients in what is
described as a ‗debt peonage‘ relationship. In some instances, patrons employ coercion,
intimidation, sabotage, and even violence to maintain control, and some fail to deliver
on their promises. Moreover, patrons are often unaccountable for their actions. Thus,
clientelistic relationships are often corrupt and unfair, thereby obstructing the
processes of implementing true sustainability.‖
240
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an opening to a new scene of human degeneracy and
misery.241

The system proposed in this study thus provides for leaders that
fall on their merits rather than their identities, and provides them the
incentives to ―preserve, protect, and defend‖ 242 Iraq, its citizens as Iraqis,
and its democratic experience. The proposed system will allow for the
emergence of leaders that ―strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind
up the nation's wounds....‖243
Further, Thomas Jefferson‘s remarks on the Virginia Constitution
typically applies to the case of Iraq: i.e.,244
This constitution was formed when we were new
and un-experienced in the science of government … No
wonder then that time and trial have discovered very
capital defects in it … The majority of the men in the
state, who pay and fight for its support, are
unrepresented … among those who share the
representation, the shares are very unequal. 245

The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, seems to have a similar
conviction. Al-Maliki has stated the current political system is a major

Greene. 424 & 425 ―A New Prospect in Human Affairs‖: Richard Price, ―Observation
on the importance of the American Revolution‖ (1784). Also see: Linz and Stepan. 29
―Democracy is characterized not by subjects but by citizens.‖
241

"16. Abraham Lincoln 1861-1865",
South in his Inaugural Address.
242

(accessed). Abraham Lincoln‘s warning to the

Ibid., (accessed). In his planning for peace … After Lincoln won re-election in 1864,
as Union military triumphs heralded an end to the war.
243

244

Sodaro. 262.

Greene. 369 Weaknesses Of The Virginia Constitution: Thomas Jefferson, ―Notes on
the State of Virginia‖ (1781-1782).
245
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challenge in the way of progress in Iraq.246 On Saturday, November, 8
2008, Al-Maliki, acknowledged that the Iraqi constitution was written ―‗in
haste,‘ when Iraq was in a ‗transitional stage,‘ and that the time has
come to revise it.‖247

He stated that Iraqis went too far in enshrining

fears and insecurities of the past into the political system. These fears
and insecurities were translated in the form of sectarian and ethnic
quotas. Furthermore, Al-Maliki stated this is restricting the government,
wasting the Iraqi capabilities, and, imposing inefficient figures on the
Iraqi political system. He also called on Iraqis to reconsider the form of
the Iraqi political system.248 Al-Maliki stressed the necessity for clearly
defining the jurisdictions of the central and provincial governments249
and, advocated a strong central government. 250 The Iraqi people seem to
agree also on such a vision, 251 for, Al-Maliki ran on such a platform, and
the people rewarded him.252 He won the elections by large margins253
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Yacoub.

Bushra JuhiI, "Iraq Still Needs Us Military, Official Says," The Associated Press,
11/08/ 2008. And: "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government."
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JuhiI. And: "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government."
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JuhiI.
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Ibid.
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Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 40 & 41.

Sam Dagher and Steven Lee Myer, "Iraq Voters Heed Calls for Strong Central State,"
International Herald Tribune, 02/03/ 2009. And: "Iraq's Winning Vote," The Washington
Post, 02/04/ 2009. And: "Iraqi P.M. Calls for Strong Central Government."
252

Dagher and Myer, "Iraq Voters Heed Calls for Strong Central State." And: Alissa J.
Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq " The New York Times, 02/01/ 2009.
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considering Iraq‘s proportional representation system.

He ousted rival

political entities in the Shiite provinces that wanted to further fragment
Iraq along sectarian lines by establishing a purely Shiite region in the
south.254 The defeat of these factions is testimony that the majority of
Shiites are against

such a

concept.255

However, as emphasized

throughout this study, the interactions of elites and the electoral system
are hindering translating the voters‘ choice to authority.256

And: "Iraq's Winning Vote." And: Missy Ryan, "Iraq's Maliki Emerges as Forceful
Nationalist," Reuters, 02/05/ 2009. And: Hoagland.
"Iraq's Winning Vote." And: "Failing to Collect Enough Signatures: Basra Autonomy
Referendum Petition Fails," Al-Arabiya, 01/21/ 2009. and: Ryan.
254

255

"Iraq's Winning Vote."

Christoph Bangert, "Iraq Provinces Try to Overcome Political Disarray," The New
York Times, 04/15/ 2009.
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Chapter IV:
Reforming the Iraqi Electoral system

Restructuring the electoral system is vital to achieve the strategic
objective of OIF. Former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, rightly stated
that:
Unfortunately, neither Washington nor the
government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki seems to
understand that reconciliation between Iraq‘s ethnic
and religious groups will begin only when we change
the flawed electoral system … This restructuring of the
electoral process will be the beginning of the end of the
sectarianism that now dominates Iraqi politics and our
dysfunctional government.257

Electoral systems in any state are consequential, and vital for
shaping any political system.258 The characteristics of any state highly
depend on its political system.259 The political system determines how
people are represented, how the institutions are shaped and developed,
and even highly influences the actions of the elites.260 Electoral systems
determine the ―structure of the party system, the ways in which
257

Allawi.

258

Sisk. 1, 2, & 3 And: Stone. 288 & 295. Also see: Horowitz. 116.

Sisk. 1 ―the political pathway of transition and especially the initial, post-war
electoral process matters for significantly for state-building. The transition sequences
and institutional choices made in war-settlement negotiations often determine the
nature and timing of initial post-war elections; in turn, these electoral processes deeply
affect the nature of the state that emerges for years to follow.‖ And: Stone. 354 And:
Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," in Neorealism and Its Critics, Ed. , 27-46. , ed.
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 74.
259

Stone. 354, 355, 356 & 375 and: March and Olsen. 738 ―the new institutionalism
insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions. The state is not only
affected by society but also affects it. Political democracy depends not only on economic
and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions.‖
260
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candidates craft their appeals, and the overall character of the
contest.‖261
The first step must be to tackle the dangers of a faction. As James
Madison wrote ―Among the numerous advantages promised by a well
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed that
its tendency to break and control the violence of faction … this
dangerous vice.‖262 The objective of the formation of government must be
―to secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a
faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government.‖263
The chapter proposes politically systemic changes that foster
democratic political competition based on the interests of the people
rather than identities.

Furthermore, such changes are required to

ensure smooth and decisive action by a unified government to meet its
obligations264 rather than a government torn by the struggle of power,
and the vice of faction. The advocated solution is based on the necessity
to settle and filter differences outside the government, and through
Sisk. And: Hall and Taylor. 937 & 938 ―institutional organization of the polity or
political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behavior and generating
distinctive outcomes … the state is no longer a neutral broker among competing
interests but a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and
outcome of group conflict.‖
261

262

Madison. 56 & 57 ―The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.‖
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Ibid. 61 ―The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.‖

Jerome G. Kerwin, "The Presidential Elections," The Review of Politics 10, no. 2
(1948). 148.
264
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electoral competition.265 The theoretical foundation for such a remedy is
that:
Elections are the principal means … to
determine initial control of state institutions by either
affirming existing patterns of power or ushering in new
elites and by re-arranging state-society relations … the
extent to which electoral processes contribute to
capable, responsive states and to other alternatives
such as captured, fragmented, or weak states … In
some circumstances, electoral processes are the critical
turning point that ends an uncertain, and usually
turbulent, transition period and may in fact be the key
ingredient in moving beyond the vulnerabilities of postwar settings to ongoing political violence. 266

Such

―‗electoral

engineering‘—changing

the

formal

electoral

rules—has the capacity to generate major consequences by altering the
strategic behavior of politicians, parties, and citizens.‖ 267 ―The challenge
… is to devise electoral rules that compel serious candidates to secure
significant cross-factional support.‖268
Essentially, instead of the infusion of powers, the concept of
separation of powers needs to be introduced in Iraq.269

Each branch of

government—legislative, executive, and, judicial—must not depend on

265

Ibid. 148.

266

Sisk. 1, 2, & 3.

267

Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 8.

Hall and Taylor. 937 ―institutional organization of the polity and economy structures
conflict so as to privilege some interests while demobilizing others.‖ The same
argument can be applied to privileging types of actors.
268

Hazan. 30 & 31 ―in parliamentarism the executive emerges from and is responsible
to the legislature-a fusion of executive and legislative powers, or power sharing; whereas
in presidentialism, there exists a separation of executive origin and survival from the
legislature-a separation of powers.‖
269
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any other branch for its existence, but on the will of the people.270 Each
branch of government needs to have separate responsibilities, 271 as well
as authorities to examine the performance of the other branches and
balance their power.
While the purely parliamentary system needs to be revoked,272 the
proposed remedy does not follow the rigid and clear theoretical line of
political

systems273

proscribed

in

political

science—Parliamentary,

Presidential,274 or semi-Presidential.275 Instead, the reformed system
Solberg. 94 Mr. Dickenson‘s opinion, & 347-360 [The Constitution of the United
States] See Article I Section 7, Article 2 Section 2, and, Article III section 2.
270

271

Sodaro. 195.

Hazan. 27 ―Having reached such a precarious state, it finally became evident to all
involved that the time had come to improve Israel's incapacitated parliamentary system,
and to make the political system more efficient and stable.‖
272

Ibid. 33 ―can the new regime in Israel be made to fit any of the already elaborated
models? If the answer must be unequivocal, then it is no.‖
273

"The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for
Analysis," in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern
Democracies, ed. Poguntke and Paul Webb (Oxford University Press, 2005). 1 & 2 ―The
executive must be politically irresponsible to the legislature. The separation of powers is
the classic core condition of presidentialism, which ensures that the executive is not
accountable to the legislature nor removable by it. Rather, the president is accountable
only to the electorate which furnished his or her mandate to govern … Exceptionally, as
in the American case, a president may be subject to impeachment by the legislature for
reasons of gross impropriety or misconduct, but as Verney (1959) points out in his
classic account of presidentialism, this is not so much an example of political
accountability as it is of juridical control … For a political system to merit the
presidential label in a formal sense, the president must be the true head of government,
and the most common (if not only) way in which such status can be conferred in a
democracy is for the president to be popularly elected, either directly by the people or
via an electoral college which closely reflects the popular preferences of the electorate …
Presidential regimes are characterized by uni-personal executive responsibility. Under
presidentialism, only the president is mandated to govern by the people, and therefore,
only he or she is politically accountable. This does not mean, of course, that the
executive literally comprises a single individual; the US President, for instance, appoints
the members of his cabinet, who take charge of policy in different government
departments, but they are not individually responsible to the electorate (or to the
legislature, given the separation of powers which operates). Only the president himself
274
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advocated here shares some characteristics of the parliamentary, mixed
presidential and purely presidential systems. 276 Central to the advocated
alternative is the creation of direct state-society relations, and, the
presidentialization of politics.277 This conforms to the specificities of the
Iraqi cultural context.

has a personal democratic mandate, which means that he has complete authority to
hire and fire members of his cabinet, and they are accountable directly to him: he then
carries responsibility for the entire administration … It seems to us that these three
features of a popularly elected executive, the separation of executive and legislative
power, and uni-personal executive responsibility constitute the necessary and sufficient
formal conditions which define presidentialism in a legal-constitutional sense. While the
actual autonomy and power of a president may vary considerably within these
constitutional parameters according to a variety of contingent and institutional factors,
it nevertheless remains formally a presidential regime.‖
Ibid. 3 ―semi-presidential regimes are 'double-engine systems' characterized by
dyarchic executives. That is, not only do they have popularly elected heads of state who
are politically not responsible to the legislature and have a degree of real executive
power, but this power must also in some way be shared with a separate prime minister,
the latter being formally the head of a government which emerges from the legislature
and is responsible to it (Duverger 1980 ; Linz 1994 : 48; Sartori 1994 : 131ff.; Elgie
1999 : 13). Thus, a semi-presidential regime mixes core elements of presidentialism
and parliamentarism. Its actual working mode is directly dependent upon presence or
absence of party political congruence between the president and the parliamentary
majority.‖
275

Hazan. 27, 30 ―The Israeli reformers have attempted to create a system that will be
the best of both worlds. Their aim was to maintain their parliamentary system,
tempering its drawbacks by introducing the positive elements of a presidential system,
while avoiding the disruptive and unstable characteristics of both pure regime types;‖
31 ―Israel will, therefore, move away from the parliamentary form of governments and
into a unique and hybrid category, but will not transform itself into a presidential
regime. Israel will no longer be purely parliamentary, but it will also not conform to the
pure presidential type;‖ 32 ―If Israel is not presidential, nor even semi-presidential, then
maybe a hybrid model,‖ 33 ―Israel, in short, will move out of the pure parliamentary
category but will definitely not become purely presidential, nor semi-presidential,‖ & 35.
276

"The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for
Analysis."
1 ―personalization, and in particular, the 'presidentialization' of politics
have become more widespread in recent years, regardless of formal constitutional
characteristics. For instance, in the United Kingdom long-standing concerns about
prime ministerial power have occasionally produced assertions of 'presidential' rule,
most notably in the work of Foley (1993 , 2000) … presidentialization denominates a
process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice
without, in most cases, changing their formal structure, that is, their regime-type.‖ &
3&4 ―The preceding discussion has shown that presidential systems offer far more
277
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The Iraqi National Assembly and the Chief Executive must be
elected directly by the people.278 The following measures are suggested
to reform the electoral rules pertaining to the executive and legislative
branches of Iraqi state.
A. Under the proposed system, the chief executive—as opposed to the head
of state279—is directly elected by the people.280 ―Popular mandate is an
essential precondition of the executive‘s democratic legitimacy and,

executive power resources to the leader of the executive while, at the same time, giving
him or her considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the political parties in parliament (and vice
versa). Essentially, the inherent functional logic of presidential regimes has three
effects: Leadership power resources … Leadership autonomy … Personalization of the
electoral process … It follows from this that the de facto presidentialization of politics
can be understood as the development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and
autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly
leadership-centered electoral processes. Essentially, three central arenas of democratic
government are affected by theses changes, which we may refer to as three faces of
presidentialization, namely the executive face, the party face, and the electoral face,
respectively. Presidentialization as a process means that these three faces of
presidentialization are amplified by factors other than those flowing directly from the
formal constitutional structure. In principle, all regime-types can move (to varying
degrees) between partified and presidentialized forms of government. How closely they
approach either of the opposing poles of this continuum is determined by a wide range
of underlying structural factors (such as changes in the social structure and the media
system) and contingent factors (such as the personality of leaders).‖
Solberg. 347 & 354 Article 1, Section 1 & Article 2 Section 1 [The Constitution of
the United States] and: Hazan. 25 ―an electoral reform which synthesized both
parliamentary and presidential systems of government-the Prime Minister would no
longer be chosen by the parliament following post-election coalition bargaining, but
would be directly elected by the population in a separate ballot.‖
278

Hazan. 30 ―the direct election of the head of government, as opposed to the head of
state, will put Israel in an even smaller group.‖
279

"The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for
Analysis." 1 and: Hazan. 28 ―the Prime Minister will be chosen based on general,
national, direct, equal, and secret elections. The tenure of the Prime Minister is to be
concurrent with that of the Knesset (four years), and they are to be elected
simultaneously.‖ & 31 ―In the Israeli case the chief executive will be selected directly by
the electorate.‖ & 33 ―the terminology of calling the popularly elected executive leader
in Israel by the title of Prime Minister, instead of President.‖
280
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therefore, for his or her personal authority to govern.‖281 As such, s/he
will be mainly responsible to the electorate,282 and less responsible to
political elites. This will also immensely increase the legitimacy of the
government.283
Also, the chief executive will be able to appoint the members of
his/her branch of government.284 Of course the confirmation of cabinet
members is contingent upon the approval of parliament, to check, and
balance the authority of the executive.285
According to the Iraqi constitution, the Prime Minister is the chief
executive; therefore, the PM will be able to appoint cabinet members.
This will promote cohesiveness286 and unity inside the cabinet.287 Hence,
this step will also lead to a more durable, 288 effective, and stable
system.289

"The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for
Analysis." 2.
281

282

Ibid. 1.

Blais. 255 ―those elected enjoy strong support, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of
government.‖
283

"The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for
Analysis." 2 & 3 ―This emanates directly from the fact that he or she is not responsible
to parliament, is usually directly legitimated and has the power to form a cabinet
without significant interference from other institutions.‖
284

285

Solberg. 356 The Constitution of the United States of America, Article II.

Blais. 241. And: Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 5
―in 1992 israel introduced direct elections for the prime minister to create a stronger
executive capable of counterbalancing party fragmentation in the Knesset and
overcoming the problems of frequent government turnover.‖
286

287

Blais. 241.
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Further, such a change will allow for a clearer and much more
transparent allocation of responsibility, and will, therefore, facilitate the
process of government accountability, 290 since only the executive is
accountable

to

the

people

and

the

legislative

for

his/her

own

performance—uni-personal responsibility.291 It will be quite evident
where to place the blame. Unlike the current multi-party, proportional,
consociational, and parliamentary system that is emplaced in Iraq,
blame, under the proposed system cannot be diffused.

There is a de

facto ―uni-personal executive responsibility.‖292
This proposed system also promotes autonomy in action.

The

executive is far less dependent for his /her power on the legislative
branch, or on parties and party elites. Therefore, his/her main concern
will be the people.

As such, the chief executive will be able to take

decisive293 measures and necessary decisions without worrying about
losing their power, even if the actions were directed against power nodes.
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Ibid. 241.
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Ibid. 241& 242.
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Ibid. 242 & 243.

"The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for
Analysis." 2.
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Ibid. 2.

293

Blais. 242.
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The presidentialized power of the state-society model will serve as a
welcomed solution to patronage,294 corruption,295 interparty differences,
and intraparty cleavages.296 The main source of executive power will
reside in the public.297 Such an approach facilitates a transcending of
the retroactive influence of political parties298 and political elites299 by
directly interlinking the interests of the public and executive.
However, a public that grants power to the executive; along with the
other two branches of government—legislative and judiciary—holds the
executive responsible and in check for her/his performance (see footnote
for further explanation).300
Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors‘ Barriers." ―The real problem
is the difficulty of prosecuting people for corruption, which is so widespread that it has
become one of the main obstacles to stability and progress in Iraq, according to Iraqi
and American officials.‖
294

Ibid. ―‗The reason for the massive corruption in Iraq is the belief by the corrupt that
they are shielded from prosecution by the protection afforded to them by their political
parties and sects,‖ said Rahim al-Okaili, the commissioner of the anticorruption group,
the Commission on Public Integrity …‘ Commissioner Okaili bemoans that his own
institution is riddled with corruption and cronyism.‖
295

Hazan. 28 ―Moreover, direct popular elections became perceived as the 'real' change,
almost as a panacea for curing the malaise of the entire system.‖
296

Stone. 307 persuasion is key for any person to rise to the office of chief executive.
Since, s/he has to persuade diverse people of different backgrounds of his/her merits.
Hence, ―by persuasion we bring out the highest human quality—the capacity to
deliberate,‖ 308 ―the purpose of persuasion is to elicit active response.‖ & 309.
297

"The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence,: Causes,
and Consequences," in The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern
Democracies, ed. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (Oxford University Press, 2005). 3
―While in office, the head of the executive is well protected against pressure from his
own party.‖
298

299

Ibid. 3.

To strengthen the check on the executive branch: Hazan. 29 ―the parliament can
remove a minister with an extraordinary majority … the parliament can also oust the
Prime Minister, as well, through a vote of no-confidence‖ by a super majority of 85%
300
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The formula works as follows: The greater the level of satisfaction
among the public, the stronger the executive,301 and the less space there
is available for parties to maneuver. Consequently, if the executive fails
to serve the public‘s interest, then the checks and balances formula of
the separation of powers becomes active.

This step will create double

pressure on the executive, and a greater momentum for checks and
balances, particularly when both the legislative and the public join to
exert pressure on the executive. Furthermore, parties and political elites
marginalized by this system will become vocal in outlining any mischief
on the part of the executive.302

They will become quick to recognize and

and the approval of the president or the presidency council. ―the removal of the Prime
Minister brings about the dissolution of the parliament as well, meaning that new
elections will be necessary for both … the Prime Minister-with the support of the
President, a symbolic position elected by the Parliament-has the power to dissolve the
parliament, but such a step would also end the Prime Minister's own tenure and force
new elections.‖ Furthermore, since there are concerns that: Juan Linz, "Presidential or
Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in The Failure of Presidential
Democracy. Comparative Perspectives. , ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 13 ―there is no way to hold
accountable a president who cannot be presented for reelection. Such a president can
neither be punished by the voters by defeat nor rewarded for success by reelection with
the same or a larger vote than in the previous election. A president who cannot be
reelected is ‗unaccountable.‘‖ Hence, to hold the chief executive further accountable
s/he will be able to rerun for elections; 17 & 18 However, to mitigate the fear of
concentration of power and possible manipulation and abuse of power by the chief
executives—in the case of Iraq the Prime Minister—as well as the fear of seizing power
in undemocratic means, s/he cannot hold official posts for two consecutive terms. This
means that the chief executive at a given term will be forbidden from holding any official
office in the next term. This will incentivize the chief executive to further heed to
his/her responsibilities by providing for continuity, while at the same time mitigating
the risks of allowing a person to hold the post consecutively and/or indefinitely, hence,
institutionally prevent any person from seizing power and abusing his/her authority.
"The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence,: Causes,
and Consequences." 3 ―power to lead depends directly on his electoral appeal. In other
words, leadership autonomy may make for enhanced power to lead, but it is contingent
upon electoral success.‖ And: Stone. 365.
301
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reveal issues that might tarnish the executive‘s reputation and will do so
to further their own self interests.
The UN and the CPA dismissed this option. The rationale for their
decision was that under such a system—known as majoritairan—the
winner takes all. Hence, many people would be left out, and their views
would go unrepresented. As such, grievances would emerge and violence
would escalate.

However, there is an answer to such a legitimate

concern, and the answer forms the absolutely essential foundation of the
proposed change.
Given the context in Iraq, the requirements for electing the executive
must not be only a 50%+ vote by the electorate, but the vote must be
complemented by a condition that the candidate must acquire a certain
percentage of votes in 16 out of the 18 provinces in Iraq. 303

This is

March and Olsen. 738 the system of checks and balances as well as competition will
minimize the ―Chief executives advocate reorganization of the public bureaucracy,
announce plans for making reorganizations, and regularly abandon the plans.‖
302

Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?." 44
Advocates of presidentialism argue that a president who is elected by a statewide
electorate can serve as a symbol of integration in spite of ethnic divisions. The success
of such symbolism obviously depends very much on the method of election chosen. A
simple plurality in a single election, which might assure hegemony to the largest ethnic
group, certainly would not work. The Nigerians have attempted to deal with the problem
in their constitution by dividing the country into relatively Large, ethnically
homogeneous states and requiring that a presidential candidate gain at least 25 percent
of the votes in two-thirds of the states of the Nigerian Federation to assure that he does
not represent any particular ethnic group or narrow coalition. The candidate must,
therefore, seek support all over the country. A union of any two of the three largest
groups behind a single candidate would not be sufficient support to reach the required
threshold. The distribution formula assumes a territorial concentration of groups-that
is, a certain level of homogeneity within areas but heterogeneity among areas. And:
Horowitz. 18&19 ―Interethnic and Interreligious Conciliation. Electoral systems that
produce proportional results or accountability to constituents or durable governments
may or may not foster interethnic conciliation. One way to think about electoral
systems and interethnic conciliation is to ask whether a given system provides
303
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necessary to prevent one faction (as a faction) of dominating the
executive branch, as, for example would happen if the Shiites, or the
Shiites and Kurds joined efforts against Sunnis.304

The percentage of

votes must be considered a form of threshold, a threshold that can be
calculated according to the number of minorities in the Iraqi provinces.
For example, if the percentage of Shiites in the predominantly Sunni AlAnbar province is 8% and the percentage of Sunnis in the predominantly
Shiite Basra province is 10%, then, the threshold should be set to be
`11% or more.305

politicians with electoral inducements for moderate behavior … Similarly, systems that
require candidates to achieve a regional distribution of votes, in addition to a national
plurality, may foster conciliatory behavior if territory is a proxy for ethnicity because
groups are regionally concentrated. Nigeria pioneered this approach in its presidential
elections, and now Indonesia has gone in the same direction for its own presidential
balloting. On the other hand, electoral systems that allow politicians to be elected
without behaving moderately may make post-electoral conciliation more difficult.
Coalitions that are created after elections merely to form a government of 50 percent
plus one of the seats in parliament may prove to be fragile when divisive ethnic issues
arise. So, for interethnic conciliation, the question is how the electoral system affects
the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians.‖ & 126 ―The Indonesian
constitution makers recently opted for a 50- percent-plus-one threshold plus a
provincial distribution requirement, thereby making it especially difficult for any
candidate to win on the first round if there are several candidates. It is important not to
set thresholds for victory so high as to undo the benefits of the system being adopted.
Electoral choice, in short, cannot stop at the level of the electoral system alone but
must extend to all the details of implementing it so as to gain the benefits of the system
that is preferred.‖
Stone. 365 ―the third argument of Madison … the larger the community, the greater
the variety of parties and interests it will contain and the less likely any majority of
members will have a common interests or ‗motive to invade the rights of other citizens.‘‖
304

To prevent an endless loop of electoral rounds, and an eventual stalemate, this
system can be emplaced to filter candidates, as a formal—through national elections—
substitute to the primaries in US. After the first two rounds, and distilling the
candidates down to two, then the system can go back to be a normal majoritarian
system. Such a measure is suggested to remove any possible cloaks, and overcome
stalemates.
305
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This remedy not only provides people a voice in their government, but
will also: (a) by default, institutionalize a veto and give a determining
voice to Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds—given Iraq‘s demographic and
geographic map—in choosing the chief executive; (b) promote moderate
elites306 who believe in the strategic objective of OIF and the necessary
means to fulfill that objective.307

Candidates who deploy a sectarian or

ethnic rhetoric or who are known to have such tendencies will be
disqualified at least by voters from other sects and ethnicities.308

As

such, ―the candidate for the nomination, therefore, consciously or
unconsciously acts as an agent of unification in attempting to find the
common denominator of agreement among the largest number.‖ 309
Importantly, every candidate will have to appeal to Shiite, Sunni, and
Kurdish constituents.

Median and moderate approaches will most

certainly be required to qualify for office and win the elections since the
proposed threshold that is central to the proposed re-modification, will
force those political actors310 to follow the new rules in order to maximize

Blais. 247 ―makes life tougher for those extremist parties which are the least likely to
come to some agreement with other parties … the majority rule is that a system which
produces representatives with strong and broad support and weakens extremist parties
is likely to ensure legitimacy and order … The basic argument is that, because it makes
sure that the elected have the clear support of the majority of voters and because it
makes it difficult for anti-system parties to be represented, it ensures legitimacy and
order, as indicated.‖
306

307

Ibid. 255 such system weakens extremist parties.

Kerwin. 148 ―a candidate must exercise the greatest of care that he offend no large
segment of the population‖
308

309

Ibid. 148.
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their share of the votes and secure victory in elections.311

Equally

important, the proposed threshold will either punish those political
actors who are purely ideologues by excluding them from attaining office
and marginalizing them, thus minimizing their impact,312 or force them
to adopt and play according to the rules to gain power. 313
Over time,314 such median approaches will influence the citizenry,
establishing mutually reconstituting dynamics between political actors
and the citizens.

It will also alter ―social norms, informal patterns of

behavior, and social sanctions,‖315 and ―deep seated habitual patterns of
behavior‖316 wherever and whenever they exist by reshaping such
informal rules through the actions of the empowered elites, and their

Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 6 ―rational choice
institutionalism assumes that formal electoral rules have a substantial impact upon the
strategic incentives facing politicians, parties, and citizens, so that changing the formal
rules has the capacity to alter political behavior.‖ 7 ―the core theoretical claim in
rational-choice institutionalism is that formal electoral rules generate important
incentives that are capable of shaping and constraining political behavior … political
actors are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of electoral office who respond
strategically to electoral incentives.‖
310

311

Ibid. 7.

312

Ibid. 7, 16, & 17.

Ibid. 9 ―the Darwinian theory predicts that politicians who are not vote-maximizers,
at least to some degree, will gradually become less common, because in general, they
will be less successful in gaining elections or re-election.‖
313

Ibid. 5 ―the first ‗founding‘ contests held under any revised rules may prove
anomalous and unstable, as citizens and parties learn the ropes, but their effects can
be assessed more reliable after a decade of elections held under the revised
arrangements.‖ & ―reforms … have a cumulative in the longer term ….‖
314

315

Ibid. 7.

316

Ibid. 16.

73

media campaigns.317

―Citizens respond to the alternative electoral

strategies adopted by political actors; they also respond directly to
electoral

rules

affecting

their

role

as

citizens,

with

observable

consequences evident in mass behavior.‖318
The greatest challenge to such a system will come from the
entrenched elites and the most powerful parties that dominate the Iraqi
political arena since, their grip over Iraq will be threatened, their
interests jeopardized, and their power endangered. 319
As for the Iraqi people in general, there is a fact that non-Iraqis seem
to overlook:

The Iraqi population is sensitive to political figures other

than those their sect or ethnicity but only when these figures undertake
sectarian and ethnic approaches.320 With moderates, this problem does
not seem to occur,321 as evidenced in the fact that Mithal Al-Alousi, a
member of the purely Sunni Al-Alous tribe in Al-Anbar, was elected to
parliament by votes of the Shiites in Karbala.

Al-Alousi is a stringent

critic of Iran‘s role in Iraq, at the same time he is a moderate figure with
no ethnic or sectarian biases. Furthermore, a significant portion of the
Shiite Ayad Allawi‘s—the Prime Minister of Iraq during the interim
317

Ibid. 7, also see: 17.

318

Ibid. 8.

Hazan. 34 ―The perennial debate over the various proposed reforms of Israel's
electoral and political system has been one of the most heated since the establishment
of the State, but has essentially remained stalemated because it ran counter to
immovable political interests.‖
319

320

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 96, & 103.

321

Hoagland. Also see: Woodward. 221.
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government—votes came from Sunnis in the 2004 transitional elections,
and the 2005 elections general election, and in the 2009 provincial
elections.322
B. Voters must have the say in the Iraqi National assembly.

As James

Madison stated: ―it is particularly essential that the branch of it under
consideration—the legislative—should have an immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.‖323
There are two options to materialize the above stated imperative:
First, direct vote to individual candidates—single member districts
system.—Districts are to be represented by a single representative. The
personalized

vote

will

constituencies‘ grievances.

oblige

representatives

to

heed

to

their

This is the only way for candidates to win

elections.324 It will become very clear that a representative owes his/her
position to the people and therefore must be attentive to their needs.325
This will most definitely form a closer relationship between the
constituent and the representative.326 Moreover, it is ―easier for voters to
know their representatives, to convey to them their views on what the

322

Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq ".

323

Madison. 355 ―The Federalist No. 52 - To the People of the State New York.‖

324

Blais. 256.

March and Olsen. 738 direct relation will create transparency that at least will
minimize the adverse effects of recurrent political phenomena‘s to ―Politicians announce
public support for positions they fail to defend in private. Legislators vote for legislation
while remaining indifferent to its implementation.‖ In matter that are of vital interest to
the constituency, like services essential to life.
325

326

Blais. 255 & 256. And Stone. 298.
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government should or should not do, and to reward or punish them for
their performance‖327
Furthermore,

―single-member

districts

appear

to

lead

to

representatives who have stronger constituency orientations and engage
in more activities of benefit to their constituencies‖328 where, on the other
hand, ―multi-member districts are conducive to weaker ties than singlemember ones.‖329
Former Prime Minister Allawi supported this form of legislative
elections.

He

called

for

district-based

legislative

elections

where

respective constituencies of a particular district directly elect their
representatives.330 This is preferable to the second option since, it will
establish more transparency and accountability.331
There was no need to introduce a proportional system in Iraq in the
first place to include Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds in the legislative. It seems
those who planned the Iraqi electoral process were indeed experts
completely detached from the Iraqi context—even detached from the
obvious Iraqi demographic and geographic distribution. Since, given the
fact that Kurds are concentrated in the north and inhabitant almost
Blais. 255 & 256. And: Stone 298 ―legislators face voters in single-member
districts and stand and fall on their individual records.‖
327

328

Ibid. 256.

329

Ibid. 256.

330

Allawi.

331

Blais. 256.
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purely three provinces, Sunnis are concentrated in the west and center of
Iraq, and Shiites in the south, even majoritarian elections by default,
would have included Sunni, Shiites and Kurds in parliament.
Minorities under this system—groups other than Sunni, Shiite, and
Kurds—have a personalized vote, where Iraq as a whole will be a single
district for them.332 This will enable these minorities to reach the quota
necessary for representation. Also, the dedication of a certain number of
seats for women—not less than one-quarter of the members of the
Council of Representatives333—can follow the same principle.334

Only

then, will women be truly represented, and a group dynamic of women‘s
movement will start; instead of the 25% minimum quota for participation
of women in the Iraqi parliament,335 that is currently controlled and
manipulated by politically motivated fundamentalist groups. 336 Women
today are excluded from the decision and policy-making processes.337 At

Stone. 359 & 360 ―in a society where race is an important dividing line and a factor
that deeply shape people‘s political views, minorities may need representatives of their
own race.‖
332

"Iraqi
Constitution",
United
Nations
Assistance
Mission
for
Iraq
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf (accessed 04/20/ 2009).
Article 49, Fourth.
333

Stone. 360 ―where gender is an important determinant of political power and policy
attitudes, men may not adequately represent women.‖
334

335

III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 385.

"The Codepink Report on Iraq: Iraqi Women under Siege ", Act Together
http://www.acttogether.org/codepink.htm#report (accessed 02/27/ 2009). And: Nancy
Trejos, "Women Lose Ground in the New Iraq," The Washington Post, 12/16/ 2006.
And: Ghali Hassan, "How the U.S. Erase Women‘s Rights in Iraq," Global Research
(2005).
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1054
[accessed
05/05/2009].
336
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best, the participation of women in the Iraqi political process—as it is
today—is nominal.338 The tradeoff appears to be that females who join
political entities enjoy the privileges and financial benefits of their posts
in exchange for overlooking the gender-biased acts and policies, or acting
indifferently towards women‘s sufferings. 339 Only such a quota—which
provide for women to directly elect their women representatives, rather
than risking manipulation of the women‘s quota by some political
entities—will provide genuine representation for women.

Then women

will also be able to enjoy the same prospects of legitimacy, and
transparency, and at the same time they‘ll face the scrutiny of their
constituents, as the proposed system provides in general.
The second but less favorable option for elections to the legislative is
the open list proportional representation that enables voters to vote for a
particular party,340 and at the same time choose from within the party

"Women‘s
Political
Exclusion",
Hunt
Alternatives
Fund
http://www.huntalternatives.org/pages/7630_women_s_political_exclusion.cfm?search
term=iraqi_women (accessed 02/27/ 2009). And: Hassan. And: Trejos.
337

Trejos. And: Hassan. And: "Background on Women's Status in Iraq Prior to the
Fall
of
the
Saddam
Hussein
Government",
Human
Rights
Watch
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/iraq-women.htm (accessed 05/02/
2009).
338

Arwa Damon, "Violations of 'Islamic Teachings' Take Deadly Toll on Iraqi Women,"
CNN, 02/08/ 2008. And: "Women's Rights Activist Beheaded in Iraq," CNN, 12/18/
2008. And: "Greater Efforts Needed to Boost Women‘s Rights in Iraq, Says Un", U.N.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30120&Cr=women&Cr1=iraq
(accessed 05/05/ 2009). And: "Unami: Human Rights in Iraq a Concern," UPI, 04/29/
2009.
339

Blais. 248. And: Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 55
Single Transferable Vote: ―Can be classified as proportional because of the use of the
quota for election, under this system, each country is divided into multimember
constituencies that each have about four or five representatives. Parties forward as
340

78

list the candidates they wish to represent them. 341 This is a compromise
that reconciles parties‘, and voters‘ interests. 342

This system is a

compromise between entrenched and strong party elites on one side, and
the more accurate representation of voters from the other side.343
Another advantage of this system is that it entails competition even
among party members, which is conducive to democracy. 344 However, it
is not as transparent as the first choice, and does not entail the same
levels of accountability.
To further enhance the balance between voters and strong elites—
that might create problems—the presidency council can stay as it is
now.345 At present, the presidency council in Iraq—which will give over
power to a President in the next elections—consists of a President and
two

Vice

Presidents.346

The

presidency

council‘s

members

are

representatives of the three major components of the Iraqi society—
Shiite, Sunni, and, Kurd.

This can remain unchanged, voted in by

many candidates as they thing could win in each constituency.
preferences among candidates in an ordinal fashion.…‖
341

Voters rank their

Blais.

Pierson.
116 to account for the ―volatile circumstances‖ and accommodate
entrenched interests. & 137 ―‗layering, ‗… leaving some elements of institutions in
place.‖
342

343

Blais. 249.

Ibid. 249 ―candidates to attract personal support and to discourage support for other
candidates of their party.‖
344

Pierson. 116 to account for the ―volatile circumstances‖ and accommodate
entrenched interests; 137 ―‗layering,‘ … leaving some elements of institutions in place.‖
345

346

"Iraqi Constitution", (accessed). (Article 138 First, Second, & Fourth).
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parliament.
strong

In fact, preserving this would form another check on the

Prime

transparency,

Minister

proposed

accountability,

under

decisiveness,

this
and

system.

As

cohesion,

such,

will

be

combined with oversight. This will also—to restricted extents—preserve
the interests of parties and the interests of elites, which will in turn
reduce the resistance of these parties and elites to the proposed change.
One issue remains of concern, the number of votes required to
elect a representative to the legislature.

For, ―enlarging too much the

number of electors, that renders the representatives too little acquainted
with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it
too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to
comprehend national objects.‖347 This issue must be carefully scrutinized
and its remedy calculated to reflect the delicate balance. Districts must
be delineated in a way so that candidates will largely compete against
people of their-own identity. Hence, candidates will not be able to invoke
their identities as credentials to win elections. When possible, it is better
for electoral districts to be devised to include a minority of people from
diverse ethnic, sectarian, and religious backgrounds. This will foster
conciliatory approaches by candidates in mixed districts to maximize
their votes.

347

Madison. 63 ―The Federalist No. 10 - To the People of the State New York.‖
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Establishing thresholds and means to ensure unity of action in the
Iraqi government was a worry that Condoleezza Rice voiced before the
Iraqi political system was designed by the CPA and the UN.

She

wondered whether the Iraqi electoral system ―‗could have vote thresholds‘
… to avoid a future Iraqi parliament splintered into bickering factions.‖ 348
Paul Bremer seconded such a proposition,349 and it is understandable
why he did not work to employ such a system. Rather, he went on to
institutionalize a system that would promote such ―bickering factions.‖

348
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Conclusion

Under the current system in Iraq, grievances are rampant. Judged
by its outcomes, the implemented system is clearly not functioning. 350
The security situation and everything else with it have deteriorated as the
political process progressed.351

To name only one deficiency, it took

several months to form a government352 after both Iraqi national
elections353 since the interests of different factions and parties had to be
reconciled.354 Finally, only with American interventions was it possible
to bridge the gap between the interests of the elites, and even then, only
a government of irreconcilable differences was formed, and a national
dispute government emerged. And while the several parties were busy
pursuing their narrow interests, the interests of the people were left out.
If this time of squabbling, power plays, and maneuverings had been
invested in several rounds of elections—the down side of the proposed
March and Olsen. 738 ―modern perspective in political science has generally given
primacy to outcomes and either ignored symbolic actions or seen symbols as part of
manipulative efforts to control outcomes, rather than the other way around.‖ & 741
and: "Iraq Faces 'Tough Challenges' Despite Peaceful Vote", One World
http://us.oneworld.net/article/359913-iraqis-undertake-violence-free-provincialelections (accessed 03/01/ 2009).
350

Karam. 3 and: Schwarz. 56&57 and: Galbraith. 3 and: Kenneth Katzman, Crs
Report for Congress - Iraq: Government Formation and Performance (2007). 2
351

Hazan. The same happened in Israel which indicates that the implemented system
has something to do with such a shortcoming 27 ―Due to the difficulties incurred in the
formation of governments in Israel since the end of one-party dominance, especially
during the 1980s, attempts at electoral reform finally began to receive serious
consideration. Weak government came to be perceived as a possible threat to the
continued existence of Israel's democracy.‖
352

353

Galbraith. 3.

354

Katzman. 2.
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system—at least the end result would have been a strong, legitimate, and
productive government to serve the interests of the Iraqi people.
Moreover, under the current system there is no accountability, because
people do not know who represents them—to punish or reward them, or
even to protest their grievances to,—nor do even politicians know who
they represent, this is why buck passing is the norm that has come to
define governance and politics in Iraq.
Today progress in Iraq has been attained by creating government[s]
―inside a government.‖355

Such a progress has only been achieved

through ―bypassing‖356 formal institutions to overcome fragmentation
and relying on undemocratic informal institutions.357
one agrees with the proposed system, at least it

Whether or not
channels the

consolidation of the state and its governance through democratic
institutions, and provides for a strong state that is a guarantor for
democracy;358 rather than an increasingly stronger state attained at the
expense

of

democratic

progress,

if

not

in

exchange

of

authoritarianism.359

355

Abdul-Ahad.

356

Ibid.

Bunce. 713 ―New democracies often exhibit a considerable gap between formal
institutions, which meet democratic standards, and informal practices, which do not.‖
357

Ibid. 714 ―Without rule of law, democracy cannot be fully realized … A strong state,
in short, is a guarantor of democracy—much as it is a guarantor of capitalism.‖
358

359

Abdul-Ahad.
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Furthermore, under the current system—even with the closed
party

list,

proportional

representation—there

are

no

institutional

guarantees and mechanisms to ensure a voice for all the major
components of the Iraqi society in choosing the executive.

Once the

American mediations cease to exist, if one faction cannot reach the two
thirds majority requirement—that the Iraqi constitution necessitate to
form a government,—360 then this faction can form a government by
extending a deal to another faction, completely excluding the third. 361
For example, Sunni and Shiite blocs in the parliament can agree to form
a government and exclude the Kurds, or Kurds and Shiite can agree to
form a government and exclude Sunnis. Naturally, this is a recipe for a
civil war.
To be sure, the system proposed by this study has shortcomings.
It is complex, and, necessitates great efforts and preparations. 362
Nevertheless, the efforts and the complexity of the proposed system are
insignificant when compared to the human and financial losses in Iraq
resulting from the shortcomings of the current system.

Even worse,

after-all of these human and financial costs Iraq is still not on the right
track.

For

without

the

life-supporting

governance

machines—the

presence of the MNFI and the imposed benchmarks that attempt to

360
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361

Ibid., (accessed). Article 70 (First) & (Second), And: Article 76 (First).

362

Kerwin. 151.
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enforce

spoon-fed

concepts

like

revenue

sharing,

reconciliation,

transparency, etc—the system does not seem to function.363
The proposed solution is intended to allow for the alteration of
elites, and the introduction of new elites through changing the official
―rules of the game.‖364

It promotes moderates365 that believe in the

objectives of the change that took place in Iraq in 2003. 366

It also

promotes elites with no sectarian and ethnic biases, and thus enables
the prevalence of the rule of law,367 rather than patronage.368 As General
Peter Pace stated, ―absent Iraqi leaders prepared to step up and do hard

363

"Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq."

Stone. 284 and: Pierson. 10 and: Mettler and Soss. 59 ―‗New institutionalists‘ of
various stripes explore how institutional arrangements and the "rules of the game"
structure the political agenda and shape policy design and enactment … The literature
explains how political rules and preexisting policies shape the actions of public officials
and interest groups, but it says little about the ways those same factors influence
political thought and action in the citizenry.‖
364

Hazan. 28 ―It was also hoped that majoritarian elections would help nurture and
promote moderate candidates, reduce the extreme multiparty nature of Israel's party
system.‖
365

"Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." ―teams
bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue
reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.‖
366

Allawi. ―Building democracy in Iraq … process, established through the rule of law,
a stable security environment, functioning state institutions and an emerging civil
society. Success can be achieved if we act soon to bring about the fundamental reforms
needed to provide for an Iraqi democracy with a parliament and government that are
receptive to people‘s needs. Only then can we build a country that will finally allow us
to enjoy the freedom so many have paid for with their lives.‖
367

Dagher, "Iraqi Report on Corruption Cites Prosecutors‘ Barriers." And: Myers.
―ecurity forces, despite significant improvements, remain hobbled by shortages of men
and equipment, by bureaucracy, corruption, political interference and security breaches
that have resulted in the deaths of dozens of Iraqi and American troops already this
year.
368
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things, we can‘t succeed.‖369 The proposed system will introduce elites
who carry the strategic objective of OIF in their hearts, and who will
strive pursue it, with no need for pressures. Thus, democratization and
reform in Iraq will be sustainable, and self-reinforcing.
It is very difficult to adequately emphasize the importance of
forcing candidates to appeal to cross-factional constituencies, for this will
promote moderates and preempt any factional attempt to forge interestbased coalitions. Under the proposed system, it will be imperative for the
executive to win-over cross (party, ethnic, and religious) constituencies to
ensure maximum consolidation of his or her powers.
The suggested system will force empowered elites to hold
accountable all outlaws, sabotages, terrorists, without political, ethnic,
and, sectarian meddling—a great hurdle for the coalition efforts in
establishing the rule of law, 370 and heed to the people‘s needs.
The proposed system also compensates for the immaturity of the
institutions in Iraq that liberal and institutional democracies necessitate.
This compensation is actualized by creating direct relations, checks, and

369

Woodward. 265.

"Transcript of President Bush‘s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq." ―In
earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American
forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian
violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those
neighborhoods.‖ And: Woodward. 256 George Bush‘s complains to Al-Maliki.
370
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balances among the government branches and most importantly among
the governing and the governed.371
Governance

under

such

a

system

is

the

purest

form

of

democracy,372 where the people are the sovereigns and give a portion of
their sovereignty to the government to promote the aggregate interests.
The proposed system also allows for the voices, fears, and concerns of all
Iraqis—whether Sunni, Shiite, Kurds and/or other minorities—to have a
determinant say in their government; in the mean time it allows for unity
of command once voters have casted their decision, and allows for the
formation of governments that are ―adequate to the exigencies‖ 373 of Iraq.
Such a system, in short, will be the first step and the foundation to
form in Iraq ―a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds
the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its
people.‖374 The proposed system facilitates completing the transition to
democracy in Iraq, and then consolidating it democracy.

The current

Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America. 9, 10, 11, 16 & 19. And: Tilly. 11 – 14. And: Linz and
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe. 8.
371

Blais. 247 ―the majority principle is at the heart of democracy.‖ And: Hazan. 28 ―The
direct popular election of the Prime Minister was thus adopted in the hope of not only
rectifying the faults that had become apparent in the 1980s, but also creating a more
stable and efficient system of government. The new system would return the choice of
chief executive to the voters, which in itself held intrinsic democratic appeal, and would
also grant the Prime Minister both a mandate and legitimacy.‖
372

Solberg. 55 & 59 [Proceedings of the Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the
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62 ―The Delaware Resolution February 3, 1787.‖
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system also leaves little room for elites to maneuver and thwart the
electors‘ choice, or democracy itself, since interferences for nondemocratically elected people will be increasingly difficult.
Very importantly the proposed remedy is a mechanical one.375 For,
―there is certainly persuasive evidence that electoral rules have important
mechanical effects as they help to determine which candidates are
elected to parliament and which parties enter government.‖ 376 Such a
mechanical remedy has two advantages: first, it will not induce rejection
other

kind

of

intervention

stimulate.377

Rather

than

imposing

benchmarks—an imposition that is increasingly unwelcomed by the
increasingly assertive Iraqi elites, 378—the proposed system sets a path for
swift development, through promoting cohesiveness, accountability, and
transparency in the Iraqi government, and by devising mechanisms to

Stone. 354 & 367 ―Mechanic the metaphor suggests taking our policy problems to a
mechanic rather than fighting them out in a political contest. By focusing on ends
(better for what?) rather than distribution (better for whom/) this approach conceals
questions of power. Problems of authority are converted into a matter of technical
requirement.‖ And: 285 ―rules are indirect commands that work over time … rather
than being told directly to each person in every situation that the rules cover. They
apply to a broad class of actions as ‗standing orders.‘‖
And: Norris, Electoral
Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 5
375
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Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. 5.

Marc Santora and Alan Cowell, "With Swipe at U.S., Iraq Builds Ties to French," The
New York Times, 02/10/2009 2009. ―Mr. Maliki … rebuffed a recent statement by Vice
President Joseph R. Biden Jr. that the United States would have to be ‗more aggressive‘
in forcing the Iraqis to reach political reconciliation. ‗The time for putting pressure on
Iraq is over,‘ Mr. Maliki said in answer to a reporter‘s question about Mr. Biden‘s
remarks. ‗The Iraqi government knows what its responsibilities are. We are carrying out
reform, and we are in the last step of reconciliation.‘‖ And: "Iraq's Maliki Says Biden
Criticism "Out of Date"," Reuters, 02/10/ 2009.
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empower moderate political elites—who believe in these benchmarks as
principles—that will voluntarily push forward for such benchmarks. In
short, the proposed system will empower elites that are democrats at
heart to complete the Iraqi transition democracy and to consolidate this
democracy.379 Second, the proposed system possesses the characteristics
of

―institutional

resilience‖

which

make

the

reforms,

and

the

sustainability they intend to promote, long lasting.380
Electoral arrangements must be adapted to the circumstances of
each state.381 There are no magic formulas—a one size fit all remedies.
The proposed remedy is the swiftest way to introduce a genuine and
sustainable democracy in Iraq,382 because it takes into account the
specificities of the Iraqis context. Traditional and charismatic authority
is an inherent feature of developing societies in general, and Iraq in
particular,383 it is only logical that such a model will promote natural

Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 4, 5, 71, & 72.
379

Stone. 355 ―based on the metaphor of mechanism: the content of decisions is
shaped by the structure of a process in a seemingly automatic fashion.‖ And: Pierson.
142.
380
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Paris. 84. And: Gunther. 836 & 837.

Solberg. 347 The Preamble of [The Constitution of the United States] ――We the people
of the United States … do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.‖ However, the people ―in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty and Posterity;‖ people—by electing
representatives of their own choice—with a portion of their sovereignty to carry out the
aforementioned tasks.‖ And: P359 Article VI. [The Constitution of the United States]
382
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born leaders.384

The proposed system introduces democratic systems

that rely heavily on the very charismatic factors demanded by the
cultural characteristics of developing countries, though, the charismatic
Chief Executive will also be accountable to the public. After all, national
interest, popularity, and performance will be the factors that enable the
Executive to achieve success.385
Taking the opportunity to promote such a proposed system seems
timely and appropriate,386 since social actors, and key decision making
figures have learned through experimentation, contestation and trial and
error that the current system is flawed.387 Furthermore, the convergence
of several factors388 has created a ―window of opportunity‖389 to

Howard J. Wiadra, "Introduction:," in New Directions in Comparative Politics, ed.
Howard J. Wiadra (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts and Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 2002). 6.
383

"The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence,: Causes,
and Consequences." 3 the natural focus on the highest elective office and implies that
all aspects of the electoral process are decisively molded by the personalities of the
leading candidates.‖
384
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Ibid. 28 and 30.
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Hoagland. And: Jim Muir, "Democracy Takes Root in Iraq," BBC, 02/08/ 2009.

Colin J Bennetii and Micahel Howleti, "The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling
Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change," Policy Sciences 25 no. 3 (1992). 277,
288 & 290. And: March and Olsen. 736 ―Aggregate behavior in a group can be defined
as the consequence of the interlocking of trial-and-error learning occurring at the
individual level.‖ And: III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 20 ―Too often,
Iraq‘s elected representatives treat the ministries as political spoils. Many ministries can
do little more than pay salaries.‖ Woodward. 187, 188, 191, 200, & 223 Lee Hamilton‘s
statement ―we have a government that cannot govern or that has not governed in Iraq.‖
387

Pierson. 12 ―conjunctures—interaction effects between distinct causal sequences
that become joined at particular point in time.‖ And: Hall and Taylor. 942 ―junctures.‖
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promulgate forward such a proposal. These factors are: (a) the shift in
American focus from mainly military and security aspects to an approach
that focuses more on political reforms, (b) the calls from several current
and former Iraqi elites for a political reform, and (c) the strong indication
that the Iraqi general public is prone for a stronger, and, nationalistic
government.390
However, the changes will face opposition by the same political
elites that this proposal would oust.391 Therefore, external shock
John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Second Edition ed.
(Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. , 2003). 1. And: Pierson. 134 & 135
―brief moments in which opportunities for major institutional reforms appear.‖
389

"Iraq's Winning Vote." ―Last weekend's vote, which occurred during one of the
calmest periods Iraq has experienced since the U.S. invasion, was a political triumph.
Though results are still preliminary, they show that voters strongly rewarded Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki for his forceful action against extremist militias and his secular
nationalist agenda—and punished religious parties perceived as too sectarian or too
close to Iran. The nonsectarian alliance of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi also
appears to have done well, and nationalist Sunnis gained influence in areas where they
had lacked it because of previous election boycotts. In short, Iraq appears to have taken
a step toward becoming the moderate Arab democracy that the Bush administration
long hoped for.‖ And: Rubin, "Secular Parties and Premier Lead in Iraq ". ―The relative
success of the secular parties may be a sign that a significant number of Iraqis are
disillusioned with the religious parties that have been in power but have done little to
deliver needed services. Well-known incumbent parties also did well … Maithem
Hussein, the head of an nongovernment organization tracking the election in Basra,
said Mr. Maliki‘s victory there was expected. ―Maliki has saved Basra from militias,‖ he
said. ―Basra owes him.‖ … Several politicians said the strong showing by Mr. Allawi‘s
party was notable. ―This really reflects that Iraqi society is looking for alternatives —
they do not necessarily believe that the Islamists should lead the country,‖ said Qassim
Daoud, a member of Parliament and one of the leaders of an independent, secularleaning party. ―The public are interested in services, and this election has shown them
that they can change anything by democratic means if they are not satisfied.‖ And:
Zelikow, (accessed). ―Incidentally, this means that Maliki's old party, Dawa, is molting
its old shell and becoming the new ‗state of law‘ party, standing for nationalism, central
power, and modern services.‖ And: Yacoub. ―For years, al-Maliki himself had a
reputation as a hard-line Shiite nationalist. But there are signs the public, especially in
Baghdad and other major cities, has grown weary of the religious parties that have
dominated national politics since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.‖
390

Hazan. 25 ―When it became apparent that the adoption of constituency-based
electoral methods, distorting pure proportionality in order to attain effective
391
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(perhaps better translated as American intervention) will be necessary. 392
Admittedly, this interventional role has a moral aspect as well as a
functional one since the system was imposed—not against the wish of
Iraqi people, but because of their lack of experience.
The longer it takes to realize the need to reform the political and
electoral process to achieve the initial objectives of OIF, the ―more
resilient‖ these institutions will become, and the harder it will be to
introduce the necessary reforms. 393

If such changes are not pushed

forward soon, the opportunity might be ―irretrievably lost.‖ 394
Failure in Iraq is not an option, not only for Iraqis but also for
America.395 The importance of succeeding in Iraq transcends respective
party cleavages and different presidential approaches.396

Even though

government, was not politically possible, the chances for the second reform package
diminished.‖ & 26 ―However, the direct election of the Prime Minister would have to
overcome several political hurdles before its passage.‖ And: Horowitz. 126&127
―Although I have just spoken of ‗the system that is preferred,‘ not all participants will
necessarily prefer the same system. Those advantaged by the status quo will tend to
prefer it, while those disadvantaged by it may prefer various alternatives.‖
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 76
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National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, (National Security Council (NSC), 2005). 1 and:
"President Bush Addresses Nation on Iraq War," The Washington Post, 01/10/ 2007.
―one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the
United States.‖ And: III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. 339.
395

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 8 ―Because of the gravity of Iraq‘s
condition and the country‘s vital importance, the United States is facing one of its most
difficult and significant international challenges in decades.‖ 9 ―Iraq is vital to regional
and even global stability.‖ And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 27.
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the American public opinion may be against such a policy of commitment
to Iraq, sustaining the policy of commitment to winning the war in Iraq
while modifying the approach to win the war is vital to the short and
long-term US interests.397 In short, this issue is as vital for America as it
is for Iraq.398 The sacrifices will be appreciated—by both Iraqis and
Americans—once the strategic objective of OIF is attained. From here on,
this study will summarize the important reasons that explain why
attaining the strategic objective of OIF is vital to Americans—as it has
shown how attaining the strategic objective of OIF is vital for the
interests of Iraqis. Commitment to Iraq is a vital matter for American for
at least three reasons:
First, the security of the United States is at stake and is correlated
to the victory in Iraq. In recent history, America abandoned Afghanistan,
leaving it unstable. The consequences were that Afghanistan became a
den for terrorists who used the state as a platform for attacks directed
against America and its allies. The attacks resulted in the loss of

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 9 ―Iraq is critical to U.S. interests …
Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United States is
viewed in the region and around the world.‖ 28 ―The global standing of the United
States could suffer if Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain
on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities.‖ And: Biddle, O'Hanlon, and
Pollack. 30
397

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 27 ―If the situation in Iraq continues to
deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region,
and the world.‖
398
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thousands of American lives, not to mention the financial losses and the
loss of America‘s sense of security.399
Losing the war in Iraq would be far more consequential.400 Iraq is
strategically located in the heart of the Middle East; possesses enormous
resources; and is of high cultural, historical, and, religious value to
Muslims.401 These considerations would make losing the war in Iraq
catastrophic.402
If America cuts and runs from Iraq, then Iraq will fall into the
hands of the enemies of the US.403 This will give those who hate America
a strategic location, enormous resources, and a strong case to mobilize
Muslims around the world against America. 404

399

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. 13.

400

Ibid. 5.

Ibid. 5 ―A safe haven for terrorists as Afghanistan once was, only this time in some
of the world‘s most strategic territory, with vast natural resources to exploit and to use
to fund future attacks.‖
401

Woodward. 211, 212, 259 Condoleezza Rice‘s concerned voiced to the former
President Bush ―its going to be the end of American power in the Middle East … 60-plus
years of American influence in the Gulf … were very much at risk.‖ & 295 Robert
Gate‘s remarks ―America must not fail because the regional consequences would be too
severe.‖
402

403

Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30.

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. 1 ―Iraq would become a safe haven from which
terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our
allies.‖ And: Woodward. 237 David Gordon the representative from the Intelligence
community‘s opinion.
404
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Second, securing America‘s energy necessitates that the US stays
the course in Iraq until Iraq is completely stable, and democratic. The
importance of Iraq in this regard can be summarized as follows:
I.

America, according to the most optimistic estimates will not be able to
achieve

energy

independence

in

less

than

ten

years.

Hence,

independence from the Middle East will not be attained on the short and
mid-term. Therefore, the strategic vitality of the Middle East in general
and Iraq in particular will continue to be a pressing issue,

405

even to

enable America and Americans to carry on their daily lives (see figure
4).406
II.

The oil peak is estimated to occur within a few years if, as some
calculate, it has not already occurred. The US is the largest consumer of
oil in the world; it imports 25% of the world‘s oil production. Iraq, on the
other hand, has oil resources, the second proven oil reserves. 407

To

James A. Russell, "Strategy, Security, and War in Iraq: The United States and the
Gulf in the 21st Century," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 2 (2005).
P290 ―In 2003, the Gulf states produced about 22.9 million barrels of oil per day,
accounting for 27% of the world‘s total. Approximately 15-15.5 million barrels of oil per
day transits out of the Gulf through the 34-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, making the
waterway an important pressure point in the world‘s economy. The region contains an
estimated 715 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, representing 57% of the world‘s
totals and most of the world‘s excess production capacity. Nearly 40% of the world‘s
natural gas reserves also reside in the region. The world promises to become even more
dependent on Gulf state oil producers over the next 25 years. By 2025, the Energy
Information Administration estimates that the Persian Gulf producers will be exporting
36.4 million barrels of oil per day, more than doubling their current exports of nearly 17
million barrels per day (Energy Information Administration 2004).‖
405

"Petroleum Basic Statistics ", Energy Information administration - Official Energy
Statistics from the US Government http://www.eia.doe.gov/basics/quickoil.html
(accessed 15/01/ 2009).
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make it more interesting, reports indicate that there are untapped, newly
found oil reserves in Iraq.408 The finding triples the estimates of Iraqi oil
reserves and places Iraq as the world‘s wealthiest country in terms of oil
reserves.409
Globally, the demand on oil is soaring, and supply is limited; the
competition over oil resources is escalating,410 and is destined to become
more and more heated.411 The rising demand on energy resources is a
strategic threat to the US. Therefore, the United States needs to secure
access to the world‘s oil supplies. Otherwise, the US will have to fight
much

bloodier

wars—all

out

wars—under

far

less

favorable

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 9 and: Michael Schwartz, "Why Did We
Invade
Iraq
Anyway?",
Global
Policy
Forum
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/justify/2007/1030whyiraq.htm
(accessed).
407

Muir. Iraq dramatically increased the official size of its oil reserves yesterday after
new data suggested that they could exceed Saudi Arabia‘s and be the largest in the
world. The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister told The Times that new exploration showed that
his country has the world‘s largest proven oil reserves, with as much as 350 billion
barrels. The figure is triple the country‘s present proven reserves and exceeds that of
Saudi Arabia‘s estimated 264 billion barrels of oil. Barham Salih said that the new
estimate had been based on recent geological surveys and seismic data compiled by
―reputable, international oil companies . . . This is a serious figure from credible
sources.‖
408
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circumstances.412 Thus, the vitality of Iraqi-American friendly relations
becomes apparent.413 To maintain such relations—friendly relations,—a
democratic Iraq, where moderates, as opposed to fundamentalists are
leveraged, is also apparent.
Third, Iraq is demographically, historically, and culturally, linked
to the whole Middle East region.

414

Any failure in Iraq will have a

domino effect throughout the region.415 And since the Middle East is a
vital yet very volatile region,416 any destabilization will disrupt energy
supplies to the world, and spike security threats, 417 for, the three major

John Judis, "Determining Factor: Oil and U.S. Diplomacy", Carnegie Endowment for
International
Peace
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18276&prog=
zgp&proj=zusr (accessed).
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Hoagland. The ―Carter Doctrine‖: Persian Gulf oil was "vital" to American national
interests and that the U.S. would use "any means necessary, including military force" to
sustain access to it. To assure that "access," he announced the creation of a Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force, a new military command structure that would be able to
deliver personnel from all the armed services, together with state-of-the-art military
equipment, to any location in the Middle East at top speed.
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Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 30.

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 6 ―Neighboring countries could
intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread.‖
28 ―countries in the region fear
significant violence crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to
intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional
war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring
independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and
perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time
when that country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons … Such a broader
sectarian conflict could open a Pandora‘s box of problems—including the radicalization
of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes—that might take
decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the other Gulf States, a drop in
oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus
could harm the global economy … Terrorism could grow … ‖ and: Biddle, O'Hanlon,
and Pollack. 30 and: Woodward. 235.
415

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. 1 ―The fate of the greater Middle East – which
will have a profound and lasting impact on American security – hangs in the balance.‖
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oil producers in the world are in the Middle East, and the largest portion
of the world‘s oil supplies comes from the Middle East (see figure 5).418
Over and above, pentagon strategists have defined the ―arc of
crisis‖ that stretches from ―Central and South America and spreads
through North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia.‖
This arc defines the primary threat to US security in the 21st century. 419
The Middle East is this arc‘s ―central core. Its strategic position is
unequalled … it holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the proven
and estimated world oil reserves, and it is the locus of one of the most
intractable conflicts of the twentieth century ….‖420 Iraq lies in the heart
of the Middle East and, is the second largest Arab country in the Gulf in
terms of territory and oil reserves. Thus, losing Iraq would constitute a
fatal strike to American security, economy, and status in world.
Furthermore, it is very important to keep in mind that the most
important strategy to counterterrorism is to dry the pool of terrorists‘
supporters, sympathizers, and, recruits. Losing Iraq would produce the

Ibid. 4 ―What happens in Iraq will influence the fate of the Middle East for
generations to come, with a profound impact on our own national security. Ceding
ground to terrorists in one of the world‘s most strategic regions will threaten the world‘s
economy and America‘s security, growth, and prosperity, for decades to come.‖ And:
Biddle, O'Hanlon, and Pollack. 28.
417
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exact opposite and give a major boost to the terrorists‘ cause 421 for two
reasons: First, Terrorists always emphasize that this is a war of believers
and non-believers,422 and cite their victory over the mighty Soviet
Union.423

As such, terrorists keep insuring their supporters and

sympathizers that there is no reason to believe that America also will not
be defeated, just as the Soviets.424 If such a scenario comes true, then
the terrorists‘ way of life and thinking will resonate with many more
Arabs and Muslims as the true way,425 the way that all the other
regimes, and approaches, failed to achieve.426 ―Al Qaeda will portray any

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 6 ―Al Qaeda could win a propaganda
victory and expand its base of operations.‖
421

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. 4 ―Osama Bin Laden has declared that the ‗third
world war…is raging‘ in Iraq, and it will end there, in ―either victory and glory, or misery
and humiliation.‖ … Bin Laden‘s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri has declared Iraq to be ‗the
place for the greatest battle,‘ where he hopes to ―expel the Americans‖ and then spread
―the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.‖ … Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
had openly declared that ‗we fight today in Iraq, and tomorrow in the Land of the Two
Holy Places, and after there the west.‘‖ And: "Bin Laden: America 'Filled with Fear'",
CNN
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/10/07/ret.binladen.transcript
/ (accessed 04/03 2008).
422

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. 6 ―Since 1998, Al Qaida has repeatedly cited
Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, as examples to encourage more attacks against America
and our interests overseas.‖
423

Ibid. 5 ―Placed the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region,
weakening our friends, and clearing the way for terrorist attacks here at home. The
terrorists will be emboldened in their belief that America cannot stand and fight, but
will cut and run in the face of adversity.‖ & 6 ―Called into question American
credibility and commitment in the region and the world. Our friends and foes alike
would doubt our staying power, and this would damage our efforts to counter other
security threats and to advance other economic and political interests worldwide.‖
424

Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 75 ―most of the world (with the
important exception of a reinvigorated fundamentalism in the Islamic cultural
community)—was such that there were no major ideological contestations to democracy
as a political system.‖
425
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failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory, one that will
be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and
around the world.‖427 Hence, their ideology will spread like fire in hay.428
Second, Iraq lies in the heart of the Middle East. Its capital, Baghdad,
was the capital of the largest Arabic/Islamic Caliphate. Many Muslims
around the world carry strong sentiments for Iraq. The holiest shrines to
Shiite Muslims are in Iraq. Terrorists rally supporters by emphasizing
the intentions of Americans as harboring dubious goals towards the
Islamic world, and that it intends to divide and weaken the Muslim
world.429 Hence, if Iraq fails as a state and shatters into pieces,
extremists will use this as a proof to the Muslim world that America
harbors the worst intentions towards Muslims, and targets the holiest
and most intimate places to Muslims.

These groups will have a very

strong case, backed by evidence, to mobilize Muslims from around the
world430 against the West in general and the US in particular. Terrorists

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 28 ―A chaotic Iraq could provide a still
stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al
Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that
will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the
world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al
Qaeda: they will seek to expel the Americans and then spread ‗the jihad wave.‘‖
426

427

Ibid. 28.

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. 5 ―a decisive victory over the United States,
vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and ruthless intimidation of
civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against Americans and other free people across
the globe.‖
428

429

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 31.
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will be able to rally people against any policy that America ever seeks to
pursue in the Muslim world and in the vital region of the Middle East.
Consequently, the United States will never be able to mobilize a single
soldier or have a hope for success in the Islamic world,431 nor will it be
able to advance any policy after failing in Iraq and failing it. On the other
hand, if the US abandons Iraq before the transition is completed, and
democracy is consolidated; then, even if Iraq remains a single unit, it will
fall in the hands of fundamentalist groups that will not only enslave 432
Iraqis and jeopardize their prospects for decent life,433 freedom,434
liberty,435 and democracy,436 but will also be extremely hostile to the
United States.

Ibid. 31 Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm
wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken a
strong Arab state.
430

Ibid. 28 ―Perceived failure there could diminish America‘s credibility and influence
in a region that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world‘s energy supply.
This loss would reduce America‘s global influence.‖ And: National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq. 1 ―Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of
support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost.‖ &
5 ―A failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East, with all the
attendant risks and incalculable costs for American security and prosperity.‖ & 6
―Weakened the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would
never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in
the region – a historic opportunity, central to America‘s long-term security, forever lost.‖
431

Greene. 424 & 425 ―A New Prospect in Human Affairs‖: Richard Price, ―Observation
on the importance of the American Revolution‖ (1784). ―… the consequences will be,
that he fairest experiment ever tried in human affairs will miscarry; and that a
REVOLUTION which had revived the hopes of good men and promised an opening to
better times, will become a discouragement to all future efforts in favour of liberty, and
prove only an opening to a new scene of human degeneracy and misery.‖
432
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Hence, imagine, if you will, the disruption of petroleum supplies
from

this

region

coupled

with

a

much

more

terrorist-friendly

environment, and a hatred towards America. This pretty much defines
the future of events if the US fails to attain the strategic objective of OIF
in Iraq.

Reverse the picture, however, and imagine a stable and

prospering Iraq. Imagine what the triumph of democracy over extremism
would mean for American foreign policy and its acceptance, especially in
a region where the people are hanging in the balance, awaiting for a way
out of their suffering, into a way of life that improves their status.
President Obama campaigned against American presence in Iraq.
He has maintained that he ―will responsibly end the war in Iraq and
focus on Afghanistan, the refuge for the terrorists who attacked us on
September 11.‖ However, terrorists are not tied to a land or restricted by
nationality. Their threat is transnational.

Therefore, if Iraq is neglected

it will be much more devastating since terrorists will then have a strong
hold in the Middle East, specifically in a country so resourceful and
strategically located. In such a scenario, the impact of the Afghan-Arab
phenomena and the September 11 attacks will be minor compared with
what could happen if Iraq becomes a safe haven for terrorists. America,
will then have to return to Iraq under less favorable circumstances just
as they did in Afghanistan. As such, this study have tried to summarize
435

Ibid.

436
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the reasons, why America, to serve its own interests—that also coincide
with Iraqi national interests as shown throughout this study—must
maintain its commitment to Iraq until the strategic objective of OIF is
materialized.
Finally, people must not lose sight of the fact that Iraq is still in
transition from dictatorship. Transitions are not cakewalks; they are
thorny and complicated processes.437

It has been six years since the

overthrow of Saddam‘s regime and the transition from dictatorship. Six
years is shorter time period than the actual allied occupation of Japan,
which took seven years.438 America has a moral responsibility towards a
country inhabited by 27 million citizens, for it responsible for forcing the
change that took place in Iraq.439

437

O'Donnell and Schmitter. 3-6, & 10.

438

Sodaro. 267.

III and others, The Iraq Study Group Report. 9 ―Because events in Iraq have been set
in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has both a national and
a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy.‖
And: William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 5th ed.
(Thomson Wadsworth, 2007). 271-273. Also see: Robert Kagan, "Neocon Nation:
Neoconservatism,
C.
1776",
World
Affairs
Journal
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Spring/full-neocon.html (accessed).
―Washington Post/ABC News poll in April 2003 found that, … more than 70 percent of
Americans supported the war, and a CBS poll revealed that 60 percent of Americans
believed it had been worth the sacrifice even if no weapons of mass destruction were
ever found. A month later, a Gallup poll found that 79 percent of Americans considered
the war justified with or without conclusive evidence that Saddam Hussein had
possessed weapons of mass destruction, and only 19 percent believed the discovery of
such weapons was necessary to justify the war. The nation‘s political leaders were
similarly supportive up to that point. The key vote in the Senate in the fall of 2002
passed 77-23, with 29 of 50 Democrats voting to authorize the war.‖ And: "Floor
Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on S.J. Res. 45, a Resolution to Authorize
the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq, October 10, 2002", Senator Hillary
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Rodham Clinton
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